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ARTICLE
TERMINATING HOPE: DEFENSIVE MEDICINE IN CASES OF POOR
PRENATAL DIAGNOSES
Andrew T. Bodoh*
INTRODUCTION
In early 2015, I was blessed with the birth of a daughter who has severe
special needs.1 I cherish the memories of her birthday. My wife had nearly
eight months of motherhood already (my daughter was born five weeks
early), but I experienced the joy of fatherhood as I sat with my first child in
the NICU for several hours, as my wife rested.
We first learned of our daughter’s condition some fifteen weeks before,
when the twenty-week ultrasound revealed cerebrospinal fluid occupying a
large part of my daughter’s cranium, indicating a substantial, congenital
brain malformation. My wife and I were referred to a children’s hospital
where, after a long day, we met the attending physician, a resident, and a
social worker in a small room to receive the prognosis. The prognosis was far,
far worse than the reality I witnessed in the NICU less than four months later.
We were told, for instance, that our daughter would likely require continual,
institutional medical support if she survived the first days after birth. Instead,
with the care and encouragement of several excellent medical providers,2 my
daughter was discharged from the hospital within four days of her birth,
without major interventions in the NICU. At four years old, she is nonverbal,
nearly blind, and suffers from cerebral palsy, epilepsy, and a gross motor
development delay, but she has not required prolonged institutionalization
or in-home medical supervision. She loves music, going to school, and
exploring the world with her hands and her tongue.
My wife and I declined the abortion offered to us in conjunction with the
poor prenatal prognosis. As a litigation attorney, though, the experience
made me wonder how the medicolegal system, including the risk of lawsuits
* Senior Associate of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, P.C., a Richmond, Virginia
litigation and civil rights firm. Graduate of Ave Maria School of Law in Naples, Florida (2010,
JD) and Christendom College in Front Royal, Virginia (2007, BA).
1. Andrew T. Bodoh, Hope Has Become a Liability Risk in Cases of Poor Prenatal
Diagnoses, SAVE THE 1 (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.savethe1.com/2017/02/03/hope-hasbecome-a-liability-risk-in-cases-of-poor-prenatal-diagnoses-by-andrew-t-bodoh-esq/;
Zoe Romanowsky, Little Girl Born with Rare Brain Disorder Defies Doctors Expectations,
ALETEIA (Feb. 27, 2017), https://aleteia.org/2017/02/27/little-girl-born-with-rare-braindisorder-defies-doctors-expectations.
2. In particular, the author thanks doctors M.E., K.E., J.A., and nurse T.R.
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alleging prenatal negligence, may influence a medical provider’s behavior in
such instances. In particular, what factors may encourage a medical provider,
when addressing an adverse fetal condition, or the risk of an adverse fetal
condition, to present a worst-case scenario to the family, or to speak with
greater confidence about future hardships for the child and the family than
the scientific evidence supports, or otherwise to encourage the termination
of the pregnancy? While I do not know if, or to what extent, particular
medical providers (such as my wife’s) have been influenced by these factors,
this Article identifies and studies those systematic incentives.
Put another way, this Article examines the reasons medical providers may
practice defensive medicine by promoting elective abortions in response to
adverse prenatal diagnoses.3 While many articles and cases have asserted a
connection between the risk of lawsuits alleging prenatal negligence and the
practice of defensive medicine in prenatal care, this Article examines the
systemic connections in much greater detail within its narrow focus of
adverse prenatal diagnoses.4 This Article considers, for instance, the
3. This Article focuses on adverse prenatal diagnoses, rather than other prenatal or
preconception scenarios, such as adverse preconception genetics screenings or counseling,
failures to provide or recommend preconception genetics screenings or counseling, failures to
diagnose or treat fetal conditions properly in utero, or ineffective sterilizations or abortions.
While such scenarios are often discussed in connection with one another, each has distinct
practical, medicolegal dynamics, and so this Article focuses on prenatal diagnoses specifically.
4. See, e.g., Plowman v. Fort Madison Cmty. Hosp., 896 N.W.2d 393, 407 (Iowa 2017)
(accepting a wrongful birth claim and rejecting arguments about an increased risk of defensive
medicine and more abortions); Reed v. Campagnolo, 630 A.2d 1145, 1152 (Md. 1993) (noting
arguments of counsel that recognition of wrongful birth suits will cause overutilization of
medical tests, affecting the standard of care); Albala v. New York, 429 N.E.2d 786, 788 (N.Y.
1981) (discussing the risk of physicians avoiding treatments that may cause birth defects in
future pregnancies); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 818–19 (N.Y. 1978) (Wachtler, J.,
dissenting in part) (“A doctor exposed to liability of this magnitude will undoubtedly, in
marginal cases, be inclined to practice ‘defensive medicine’ by advising abortion rather than
run the risk of having to pay for the lifetime care of the child if it is born with a handicap. Thus
the majority’s decision will involve human costs as well, in those cases where otherwise healthy
children will be unnecessarily aborted as the only alternative to the threat of pecuniary
liability.”); Paola Frati et al., Preimplantation and Prenatal Diagnosis, Wrongful Birth and
Wrongful Life: A Global View of Bioethical and Legal Controversies, 23 HUM. REPROD. UPDATE
338, 347 (2017) (discussing English judicial opinions that oppose such causes of action based
on concerns about defensive medicine, including abortion recommendations); Anthony
Jackson, Action for Wrongful Life, Wrongful Pregnancy, and Wrongful Birth in the United
States and England, 17 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J 535, 554 (1995) (referencing “subconscious
pressure to advise abortions in doubtful cases out of fear of actions for damages”); Michael A.
Mogill, Misconceptions of the Law: Providing Full Recovery for the Birth of the Unplanned
Child, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 827, 836 n.50 (referencing “unnecessary tests or operations”);
Darpana M. Sheth, Better Off Unborn? An Analysis of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Claims
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connections between adverse patient outcomes and the risk of informal
punishments, the influence of post-viability or late-term abortion bans in
such cases, and the inherent challenges facing a provider in addressing an
adverse prenatal diagnosis with a family.5
Adverse prenatal diagnoses are difficult for all involved, and this Article
tries to be fair to providers and patients alike. My experiences6 and opinion,
however, undoubtedly shape the language I choose and the arguments I
advance. I support a broader legal recognition of fetal rights than the status
quo, and I have sympathies with the social model of disability, which
emphasizes the role social assumptions play in the limitations experienced by
those with medical or mental health conditions.7 To illustrate, when a
wheelchair-bound person encounters a stairway, the social model of
disability recognizes that the medical condition does not alone limit the
person’s access to the next floor; rather, the stairway itself and the implicit
assumption that people can climb stairs also cause the limitation the person
experiences.8
Part I of this Article examines generally the medicolegal context that gives
rise to the so-called practice of defensive medicine. It argues that providers
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 73 TENN. L. REV. 641, 665 (2006) (referencing the
use of excessive medical testing); Paula Bernstein, Comment, Fitting a Square Peg in a Round
Hole: Why Traditional Tort Principles Do Not Apply to Wrongful Birth Actions, 18 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 297, 319 & n.139 (2001) (discussing the likelihood of excessive testing);
Carolyn Lee Brown, Editorial Note, Genetic Malpractice: Avoiding Liability, 54 U. CIN. L. REV.
857, 880 (1986) (referencing overuse or avoidance of prenatal diagnostics); Matthew Diehr,
Comment, The State of Affairs Regarding Counseling for Expectant Parents of a Child with a
Disability: Do ACOG’s New Practice Guidelines Signify the Arrival of a Brave New World?, 53
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1287, 1301–02 (2009) (referencing the ACOG’s recommendations that all
pregnant women undergo prenatal Down syndrome screening, and suggesting such practices
“may place excessive pressure on women to have an abortion”); Bernadette Kennedy,
Comment, The Trend Toward Judicial Recognition of Wrongful Life: A Dissenting View, 31
UCLA L. REV. 473, 500 (1983) (referencing the risk of “overdeterrence of potential birth
defects” through physicians recommending abortion “where the mother is at even a slight
risk” for birthing a child with special needs); W. Ryan Schuster, Note, Rights Gone Wrong: A
Case Against Wrongful Life, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2329, 2348 (2016) (referencing both the
risk of excessive prenatal screening and of incentivizing the physicians to recommend
abortion); see also, e.g., Thomas Keasler Foutz, Comment, “Wrongful Life”: The Right Not To
Be Born, 54 TUL. L. REV. 480, 493 n.82 (1980) (arguing that to avoid suits, physicians must
merely obtain informed consent).
5. See infra Parts I and II.
6. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
7. Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions,
40 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. Rev. 141, 147–49 (2005). This social model is typically described as a
competitor of the more traditional medical model of disability, in which the limitations are
viewed as arising simply or predominantly from the medical condition. Id. at 146–47.
8. Id. at 148.
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wish to avoid formal and informal punishments that stem from disciplinary,
civil, and criminal processes, and this means avoiding adverse patient
outcomes. Part II then examines the risks associated with poor prenatal
diagnoses specifically, including the risk of lawsuits alleging prenatal
negligence, and the practical difficulties medical providers face in addressing
fetal anomalies. Part III examines an extraordinary case from Connecticut,
Meleney-Distassio v. Weinstein, in which a couple sued two physicians for
recommending an abortion based on an erroneous prenatal diagnosis. This
case illustrates many of the concerns identified in this Article. Part IV argues
that the current arrangement has social and moral costs. Part V then surveys
the pros and cons of several options for improving the situation.
I. THE MEDICOLEGAL CONTEXT
To understand why a medical provider may try to terminate a parent’s
hope for a child in utero in response to prenatal evidence of an adverse fetal
condition, one should explore the broader context, assessing the medicolegal
system at a much more general level and approaching the problem
incrementally. The first section of this Part provides a general framework for
understanding defensive medicine, and the second section looks more
specifically at medical malpractice lawsuits within this framework. Part II
then looks at defensive medicine in the context of poor prenatal diagnoses.
A.

From Patient Autonomy to Defensive Medicine

Today, our society expects every competent patient to cooperate, and to
be allowed to cooperate, in decisions pertaining to his or her medical care.9
Indeed, the patient is typically considered the final decision-maker in most
matters concerning medical treatment.10 As the American Medical
9. See CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS §§ 1.1.3–1.1.4 (AM. MED. ASS’N 2016), https://www.amaassn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/code-of-medical-ethics-chapter-1.pdf;
Sandra H. Johnson, Regulating Physician Behavior: Taking Doctors’ “Bad Law” Claims
Seriously, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 973, 982 (2009) (describing informed consent as “one of the
fundamental building blocks of the modern physician-patient relationship”); id. at 984
(describing the “building blocks of bioethics” as including an “emphasis on individual rights
[and] the primacy of autonomy”).
10. CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS §§ 1.1.3–1.1.4 (AM. MED. ASS’N 2016), https://www.amaassn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/code-of-medical-ethics-chapter-1.pdf;
Johnson, supra note 9, at 982, 984; Kristen Ann Curran, Comment, Informed Consent: A Right
Without a Remedy Examined Through the Lens of Maternity Care, 21 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 133, 138 n.25 (2012); Darrin P. Dixon, Informed Consent or Institutionalized
Eugenics? How the Medical Profession Encourages Abortion of Fetuses with Down Syndrome,
24 ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 46 (2008) (“Twenty-years ago doctors were the sole medical decision-
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Association’s Code of Ethics states, “Autonomous, competent patients
control the decisions that direct their health care.”11 This ideal, however, is
undermined by the complexities of modern medicine. The practice of
medicine requires expertise. Even apart from the skills required, for instance,
to perform surgery or to use specialized medical equipment, patients often
do not have the capacity or the know-how to collect and to digest the
information necessary to make timely, informed healthcare decisions
without the counsel of medical professionals.12
The divide between the ideal of patient autonomy and the need for expert
care challenges the medicolegal system, and our society has adopted the
approach of cautious trust in medical professionals.13 With respect to trust,
we as individuals, and collectively as a society, allow medical professionals to
guide us in life and death decisions, often with the mantra that the doctor
knows best.14 We expect medical professionals to have answers to our
questions about what we are experiencing, what is causing it, and what will
cure it. We also allow medical providers fairly broad discretion in their
professional sphere.15 At the same time, we act with caution. We impose
training and testing on those attempting to enter the profession to determine
if they are worthy of our trust.16 We also regulate, for instance, what drugs
makers and now much emphasis has been placed on patient autonomy and self-determination
within the medical context.”).
11. CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 1.1.4 (AM. MED. ASS’N 2016), https://www.amaassn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/code-of-medical-ethics-chapter-1.pdf.
12. See generally Timothy E. Quill & Howard Brody, Physician Recommendations and
Patient Autonomy: Finding a Balance Between Physician Power and Patient Choice, 125
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 763 (1996).
13. Cf. Johnson, supra note 9, at 978 n.27 (“Trust has assumed a central position in
discussions of efforts to regulate physician behavior. Most of the literature addressing the
difficult issue of the extent to which society, and patients in particular, generally trusts
physicians, explains patterns in the regulation of medical practice or can be used as a guide for
choices in regulatory form”); Quill & Brody, supra note 12 (discussing the need to balance the
patients’ autonomy and the physicians’ expertise).
14. Cf. Katherine Say, Note, Wrongful Birth – Preserving Justice for Women and Their
Families, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 251, 284 (2003) (“Real danger lies . . . in physicians’
misperception that their patients rely on the practitioner to make decisions for them. Society
has long conferred on physicians the extraordinary power they presume. This power manifests
itself in the control of information flow, to the detriment of informed prenatal decisionmaking. In addition, a physician’s advice may be colored by personal political or moral beliefs,
destroying the ideal of judgment-neutral information exchange.”).
15. Id.
16. See DAVID A. JOHNSON & HUMAYUN J. CHAUDHRY, MEDICAL LICENSING AND DISCIPLINE
IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THE FEDERATION STATE MEDICAL BOARDS 1–2 (2012) (summarizing
the training and licensure requirements but noting “the system is not foolproof, judging by
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reach the market, what medical claims the drug manufacturers may make in
the marketplace, and who has the power to prescribe and dispense such
drugs.17
We also allow medical professionals to be held accountable for breaches
of trust through formal professional discipline, civil liability, and even
criminal sanctions.18 In theory, the medicolegal system administers formal
disciplinary, civil, and criminal sanctions for breaches of established medical,
legal, and ethical standards, with the protections of due process, in order to
discourage, remedy, and punish such breaches.19 In practice, however,
medical providers experience informal punishments or adverse
consequences before, during, and after such proceedings.20 Informal
punishments include, for instance, inconvenience, distress, personal or
professional humiliation, financial costs, legal fees, temporary suspension or
loss of medical privileges, administrative leave, and loss of employment.21
While in theory medical providers have nothing to fear if they comply with
medical, legal, and ethical standards, as the process will protect the innocent

the caseloads of today’s state medical board investigators and the more than 6,000 substantive
disciplinary actions . . . taken annually against physicians”).
17. See Suzanne White Junod, FDA and Clinical Drug Trials: A Short History, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/media/110437/download (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
18. See generally Kara M. McCarthy, Note, Doing Time for Clinical Crime: The Prosecution
of Incompetent Physicians as an Additional Mechanism To Assure Quality Health Care, 28
SETON HALL L. REV. 569 (1997) (discussing the various methods of disciplining physicians for
errors in medical practice).
19. See id.
20. See Barry R. Furrow, The Patient Injury Epidemic: Medical Malpractice Litigation as a
Curative Tool, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 41, 48 (2011) (indicating that physicians “are no longer able
to pass increased malpractice premiums on to their patients or insurers”); Johnson, supra note
9, at 978 (“There is a rather substantial body of research . . . that identifies apparently unique
experiences, motivations, and reactions on the part of physicians. Research examining the
training of physicians, for example, reveals heightened sensitivity to shame associated with
errors . . . . In addition, significant distrust on the part of physicians toward the legal system
may influence them to react differently to legal risks and incentives as compared to other risks
and incentives.”); id. at 1029 (“The costs [to physicians] of the inquiry or investigation include
financial costs, disruption of the practice, damage to reputation, resultant ostracism or
termination of necessary business relationships, stress, shame, and other losses that are quite
significant.”); McCarthy, supra note 18.
21. Furrow, supra note 20, at 48; Johnson, supra note 9, at 978, 1029; Haavi Morreim,
Malpractice, Mediation, and Moral Hazard: The Virtues of Dodging the Data Bank, 27 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 109, 115–116 (2012).

2020]

TERMINATING HOPE

7

from formal sanctions,22 informal punishments arising from the process fall
on the innocent as well as the guilty, and there is also the risk of erroneous
judgments.23 Medical providers, therefore, may reasonably try to reduce the
risk of formal and informal punishments, rather than simply avoiding the
behaviors that are legitimately the target of formal punishments. This means,
in practice, physicians should try to avoid unexpectedly severe adverse
patient outcomes.
A bad patient outcome—that is, any outcome perceived to be both
unexpected and adverse by the patient, the patient’s family, or others—
increases the risk of formal or informal punishments in several ways. First,
an adverse patient outcome may cause someone to initiate formal
proceedings.24 The poor outcome may motivate the patient or the patient’s
family to file a civil, criminal, or disciplinary complaint against the medical
provider. Similarly, an adverse outcome may influence those who witnessed
actual or suspected provider misconduct to report it. A severe adverse patient
outcome might also trigger an automatic investigation under established
institutional policies. Second, a patient’s outcome may be a factor in
determining the time and resources dedicated to the formal investigation, as
part of a civil, criminal, or disciplinary process. This is often a matter of
resource allocation—using limited resources on matters deemed the most
important—but other factors, such as legal strategy, may contribute to this.
For instance, a medical practice may limit its internal investigation of a
simple medical error because the information it uncovers may be used
against the organization in a civil suit.25 A severely adverse patient outcome,
however, may compel the practice to investigate in depth. Third, an adverse
outcome may tip the balance to a finding of wrongdoing. For instance, the
22. See, e.g., Foutz, supra note 4, at 492 n.82 (critiquing concerns about a link between
lawsuits and defensive medicine by arguing that to avoid suits, physicians must merely obtain
informed consent).
23. Michael D. Benson et al., Hospital Quality Improvement: Are Peer Review Immunity,
Privilege, and Confidentiality in the Public Interest?, 11 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 2, 8–11 (2016);
David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice
Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2027–28 (2006); Paul C. Weiler, The Case for No-Fault
Medical Liability, 52 MD. L. REV. 908, 926–27 (1993).
24. See Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors that Prompted Families To File Medical
Malpractice Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1359, 1359 (1992);
Wendy Levinson, Doctor-Patient Communications and Medical Malpractice: Implications for
Pediatricians, 26 PEDIATRIC ANNALS 186 (1997).
25. Cf. Margo Schlanger, Second Best Damage Action Deterrence, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 517,
517–18, 532 (2006) (discussing the “suppression of information-production for fear of
resulting litigation”).
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outcome may color the evaluation of the evidence.26 Similarly, scapegoating
is a possibility—blaming the provider for the bad outcome for the sake of
public perception or to shift attention away from other blameworthy people,
institutions, or practices.27 Fourth, the bad patient outcome may be a factor
in evaluating the formal sanctions administered, whether legitimately or
illegitimately.
Medical providers may overestimate the personal and professional risks of
bad patient outcomes.28 Day-to-day experiences—such as periodic
malpractice insurance payments or the stories from colleagues and
instructors—may affect a provider’s evaluation of the risks, making the
provider unduly wary of adverse proceedings.29 The American Medical
Association (“AMA”), advocating for tort reform, highlights the concerns
this way:
Because being sued is such a common event over the
course of a physician’s career, and because medical liability
insurance is so costly, the fear of liability hangs like a cloud
over physicians—and it never goes away. The liability
environment influences how physicians practice and affects
patients’ access to care and treatment.30
The risks associated with adverse patient outcomes may motivate
providers to avoid these outcomes though objectionable practices. A
provider may, for instance, recommend or undertake tests or procedures that
involve risks, costs, or patient suffering disproportionate to the anticipated
medical benefit, to avoid a small or remote risk of an adverse patient

26. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 203–04 (2011) (discussing
outcome bias—the tendency in hindsight to blame decision-makers for not avoiding a bad
outcome).
27. See Barry R. Furrow, Enterprise Liability and Health Care Reform: Managing Care and
Managing Risk, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 79, 94–95 (1994) (noting that medical malpractice cases
focus on physician mistakes rather than other causes of poor healthcare).
28. See Katharine Van Tassel, Harmonizing the Affordable Care Act with the Three Main
National Systems for Healthcare Quality Improvement: The Tort, Licensure, and Hospital Peer
Review Hearing Systems, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 883, 912 n.138 (2013).
29. Cf. Jodi Halpern & Robert M. Arnold, Affective Forecasting: An Unrecognized
Challenge in Making Serious Health Decisions, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1708, 1710 (2008)
(“[S]tudies show that physicians’ specific professional biases may lessen their ability to see
patients’ situations clearly, for example, when they are overly influenced by the memory of a
rare bad outcome.”).
30. AM. MED. ASS’N, MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM NOW! 2 (2018 ed.), https://www.amaassn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/premium/arc/mlr-now.pdf.
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outcome.31 The provider may inflate the adverse prognosis or diagnosis, or
overstate the risks of the condition to the patient, or pretend a test or practice
is routine, in order to justify a course of care the patient might otherwise
reasonably reject, or to otherwise influence the patient’s expectations and
mitigate the patient’s surprise if an adverse outcome occurs.32 The provider
may also refer, transfer, or decline to care for patients with a heighted risk of
an adverse outcome.33 A provider might try to hide a bad outcome, obscure
its cause, or make the case more difficult to prove for the potential claimant
and easier to defend for the provider.34 The provider may substitute a more
active course of care for a more passive one to impress the patient that what
can be done is being done.35 A provider may make treatment decisions
intended to minimize the risk or type of formal or informal punishments if
an adverse outcome is probable or unavoidable.36 Using these practices,
whereby the best medical care and judgment is subordinated to efforts to
mitigate the provider’s professional or legal risks, is typically called the
practice of defensive medicine.37
In short, defensive medicine is not simply the fault of medical providers
or the medical establishment. It is, in part, a byproduct of a system that
subjects medical providers to formal or informal punishments that correlate
too strongly with adverse patient outcomes rather than actual provider
misconduct. With this overview in mind, the next section specifically
explores the role of civil malpractice lawsuits in the medicolegal system and
how these suits motivate the practice of defensive medicine.

31. See Isaac D. Buck, Overtreatment and Informed Consent: A Fraud-Based Solution to
Unwanted and Unnecessary Care, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 901, 910–13 (2016) (discussing the
provision of unnecessary treatment); Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Distributive
Injustice(s) in American Health Care, 69 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 65 (2006); Schlanger, supra
note 25, at 517–18, 524–25; David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk
Specialist Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2609, 2612–
13 (2005); Mark Strasser, Yes, Virginia, There Can Be Wrongful Life: On Consistency, Public
Policy, and the Birth-Related Torts, 4 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 821, 833 (2003); AM. MED. ASS’N,
supra note 30, at 5.
32. Cf. Schlanger, supra note 25, at 517 (“[P]otential litigation can induce potential
defendants to favor more cognizable or demonstrable care, and less cognizable or
demonstrable harm.”).
33. Id. at 534.
34. Id. at 517–18, 525, 532–33.
35. See Levinson, supra note 24 (discussing how perceptions of poor communication and
inadequate attention promote dissatisfaction and motivate litigation).
36. See generally Schlanger, supra note 25.
37. E.g., Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 2609.
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Civil Lawsuits and Defensive Medicine

In regulating the practice of medicine, our medicolegal system allows
patients injured by a medical professional to sue for damages, awarded as a
monetary sum. In theory, civil lawsuits against medical providers serve
several functions. They shift the cost of the harm from the patient and social
welfare programs to those responsible for causing the harm and to insurers
of the wrongdoers.38 Such suits are presumed to deter the bad behavior of
medical professionals.39 Such suits may also award exemplary and punitive
damages.40 Litigation also typically permits a judgment on a more complete
and accurate record than other dispute resolution methods.41 In general,
these suits are intended to support the system of cautious trust in medical
professionals.42
The type of civil claim most relevant to this article is negligence.43
Negligence claims allege that some action or inaction of the medical provider
breached the applicable standard of reasonably prudent medical care. More
specifically, the plaintiff must show (1) a duty recognized in the common law,
such as the duty to act as a reasonably prudent medical provider would have
acted under the circumstances, a norm called the “standard of care,” (2) a
breach of that duty, (3) an injury, and (4) the causal relationship between the
breach and the injury.44
Notably, there must be both a demonstrable breach of the duty and
demonstrable damages caused by that breach, so a doctor will escape civil
liability if there are no provable damages, even if the doctor was negligent.
Conversely, causing an injury alone does not create liability when the
provider’s conduct was within the standard of care.45 Notably, too, as
38. See Hensel, supra note 7, at 171; Diehr, supra note 4, at 1301.
39. Christopher J. Robinette, Why Civil Recourse Theory Is Incomplete, 78 TENN. L. REV.
431 (2011); Diehr, supra note 4, at 1301; Kennedy, supra note 4, at 491–92.
40. See, e.g., Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 489–90 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980).
41. Florence Yee, Note, Mandatory Mediation: The Extra Dose Needed To Cure the
Medical Malpractice Crisis, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 393, 406–07 (2006).
42. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 31, at 65.
43. See generally Jackson, supra note 4 (discussing the various classes of negligence actions
that may arise due to prenatal negligence).
44. See generally Alan J. Belsky, Injury as a Matter of Law: Is This the Answer to the
Wrongful Life Dilemma?, 22 U. BALT. L. REV. 185, 205–248 (1993); Bernstein, supra note 4, at
302–03; Brown, supra note 4, at 861–64; Say, supra note 14, at 264–65; Foutz, supra note 4, at
488; Jackson, supra note 4; Sheth, supra note 4, at 645–648; Kennedy, supra note 4, at 482–90.
45. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 31, at 66. The asymmetry created by this rule—
namely that different medical providers committing substantially the same negligent act may
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impressive as “the standard of care” sounds, it is often little more than
whatever a paid expert witness persuades the judge or jury to believe it is.46
After all, this legal standard is intended to be flexible.47 It is not intended to
restrict the evolution of medical practice or to dictate checklist-style care
when a case-by-case approach is more appropriate. It is therefore for the
judge or jury to determine what the standard requires and whether the
standard was breached after the presentation of expert opinions and
evidence.48
The risk of civil lawsuits for negligence tends to influence medical
professionals because of the formal and informal punishments associated
with such suits.49 First, a civil suit is typically a permanent, public allegation
of misconduct.50 A civil suit is normally public from the moment the case is
filed with the court. Medical providers have obvious personal and
professional reasons to avoid public allegations of misconduct. By contrast,
many forms of employment or professional discipline are substantially
private, at least until there is a finding of misconduct.51 Second, lawsuits take
an emotional toll on the defendant.52 The process is adversarial, with parties
seeking to gain an advantage through tactics that obscure the merits of the
case. An almost random jury of laypeople may decide the merits of the
medical care provided. The provider will face inquiries from his or her
employer, attorney, and insurer, to say nothing of the opposing counsel or
party. Facing the adverse consequences of a past decision, whether the
decision was right or wrong, will also be emotionally troubling, especially in
experience dramatically different consequences based on the outcome of the act—is often
discussed in academic literature under the term “moral luck.” E.g. Justin W. Martin and Fiery
Cushman, The Adaptive Logic of Moral Luck, in JUSTIN SYTSMA & WESLEY BUCKWALTER, EDS.,
A COMPANION TO EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 190 (2016); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C.
Zipuraky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123 (2007); Morris B. Hoffman, Ten
Legal Dissonances, 62 MERCER L. REV. 989, 1007–09 (2011).
46. See Belsky, supra note 44, at 245; Adam Candeub, Contract, Warranty, and the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 45, 71–72 (2011); Christopher
Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 177–78, 184–88 (2010); Yee, supra
note 41, at 408–09.
47. E.g., Smethers v. Campion, 108 P.3d 946, 949 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
48. E.g. id. at 949–50.
49. Dixon, supra note 10, at 50–53; Havighurst & Richman, supra note 31, at 65
(“[M]alpractice claims also impose substantial reputational and emotional costs on
physicians.”); Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 2612.
50. See Weiler, supra note 23, at 943.
51. See, e.g., Benson et al., supra note 23 (discussing the privacy protections afforded to
hospital peer review processes).
52. Johnson, supra note 9, at 978, 1000–02, 1029.
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connection with a lawsuit. Third, there is often a risk of direct or indirect
financial loss, such as the obligation to pay an insurance deductible, all or a
portion of the judgment or settlement, attorney fees, or increased insurance
premiums.53 Finally, the provider will need to disclose and to explain the
circumstances of the lawsuit in the future.54
Most of the risks associated with lawsuits, unfortunately, are more closely
connected to the fact of the litigation or the process itself, rather than a
finding of misconduct by a judge or jury. Most of these harms fall on the
provider that is wrongly sued as well as the one that is justly sued. The risk of
being sued, in turn, is more strongly associated with bad patient outcomes
than with bad behavior of the medical professional.55 Several factors deter
claims—even meritorious claims—from being brought when there is no
severe, adverse patient outcome, and increase the likelihood of a lawsuit
when after a severe, adverse patient outcome, even if there was no negligence.
To understand these factors, we must look at the situation in detail from
the perspective of the claimant and the claimant’s attorney. No medical
malpractice suit exists without a claimant—typically someone who has
suffered a bad outcome and believes the medical provider is to blame, or the
patient’s legal representative. In cases involving prenatal fetal anomalies, the
claimant will be the child with special needs or the family of that child.
Because malpractice litigation is complicated, the claimant normally needs
an attorney. To get an attorney, the claimant must persuade an attorney to
accept the case, and the claimant and the attorney must broker an acceptable
fee arrangement.
In deciding whether to represent a claimant in a medical malpractice suit,
and on what terms, the attorney will usually perform a rough, and often
intuitive, evaluation of the case.56 The attorney’s initial calculus can be
summarized most simply as follows:

53. See id. at 1029; Medical Malpractice Insurance Complete Guide, CUNNINGHAM GROUP,
https://www.cunninghamgroupins.com/medical-malpractice-insurance-complete-guide/
(last visited Oct. 11, 2019); Matt Thompson, 5 Primary Factors that Affect a Physicians
Malpractice Insurance Premium, DIEDERICH HEALTHCARE (Feb. 23, 2016),
https://www.diederichhealthcare.com/the-standard/5-primary-factors-that-affect-aphysicians-malpractice-insurance-premium/.
54. CUNNINGHAM GROUP, supra note 53; Thompson, supra note 53. See also 45 C.F.R. §§
60.1–.22 (2004) (regulating mandatory reports to the National Practitioners Database, and
access to this information).
55. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 992, 999–1000; Studdert et al., supra note 23, at 2029–
31.
56. See Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 384 (2009).
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(A) Probability of obtaining a recovery
x (B) Probable recovery if successful
(C) Gross value of the case
– (D) Probable cost and fees
(E) Probable net value to client57
In a complex and labor-intensive case like a medical malpractice suit, the
attorney will typically want a substantial fee (see line D). A claimant usually
cannot afford to pay an hourly fee, as medical malpractice cases are time
intensive. The attorney, on the other hand, generally will not accept the case
on a contingency fee basis unless the gross value of the case (line C) is high,
because the fee will be a percentage of the recovery, if any.58 Considering also
the high costs of medical experts for malpractice litigation (a factor in line
D), the case must have a high gross value (line C) to offset the probable costs
and fees (line D) and produce a net value to the client (line E).
The attorney’s representation, therefore, typically depends on the
estimated gross value of the case (line C). The gross value of the case, in turn,
equals the probability of obtaining a recovery (line A) multiplied by the
probable recovery (line B). In medical malpractice claims, the probable
recovery (line B) dominates this calculation. The claimant typically can
supply enough information for the attorney to have a rough but reliable idea
of whether the recovery could be substantial (line B). In fact, the material
issue is simply whether the patient’s outcome was adverse and severe. A
severe outcome generally equates to a large recovery, if successful, and a less
severe outcome generally equates to a smaller potential recovery (line B). By
contrast, the likelihood of winning the case (line A) is often impossible to
evaluate reliably at the outset of the representation. First, the attorney often
will not know with a high degree of confidence the appropriate medical care
in the specific circumstance, or whether the adverse outcome might be
attributed to some independent cause. These facts are essential to evaluating
the likelihood of prevailing on the claim (line A).59 Second, at the outset of
the case, the attorney often does not have enough information to know what
actually happened to produce the outcome, much less what the testimony will
be at trial. Medical records, for instance, usually tell more about the severity
57. For more complicated methods of calculating this, see Thomas H. Belknap,
Calculating Settlement Value of a Case, MAR. REPORTER & ENG’G NEWS (Apr. 2014), https://
www.blankrome.com/sites/default/files/86063803942C25C141FAC6C2A1F39546.pdf; Peter
Toll Hoffman, Valuation of Cases for Settlement: Theory and Practice, 1991 J. DISP. RESOL. 1
(1991).
58. Nora Freeman Engstrom, Lawyer Lending: Costs and Consequences, 63 DEPAUL L. REV.
377 (2014); Molot, supra note 56, at 384.
59. Studdert et al., supra note 23, at 2029–31.
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of the outcome than about who, if anyone, or what, if anything, is responsible
for the bad outcome. The claimant’s narrative of events will also be unreliable
to some greater or lesser degree. A patient, for instance, will not have personal
knowledge of many aspects of the course of care, such as what happened
while under general anesthesia. Moreover, the emotional trauma of the
experience often colors the claimant’s memories of the events, making the
medical professionals appear more blameworthy in the claimant’s recounting
than the facts may justify.60 Attorneys know the same is true in reverse for the
medical professionals, creating disputes of fact. Disputes about the facts,
then, are reasonably expected and do not necessarily represent malicious lies
or bad faith. Rather, they are often the natural and predictable result of
imperfect human memory in emotionally stressful circumstances. This
creates, however, great uncertainty in the probability of winning the case
(line A).
As a business matter, a medical malpractice attorney must be cautious of
overestimating the value of the case at the outset (line C), especially if the
attorney is offering a contingency fee. As such, given the typical high degree
of uncertainty in the prospects of winning a medical malpractice case (line
A), the attorney usually will be extremely cautious to take a case unless the
probable recovery if successful (line B) is sufficiently high to offset the risk
and uncertainty. Put another way, the attorney will not take the case unless
the patient suffered a severe, adverse outcome. If the outcome is bad enough,
even a small chance at a substantial fee may be worth the risk to the attorney.
Therefore, the severity of the patient’s outcome roughly correlates to the
likelihood that an attorney will accept the representation on workable terms
and initiate a lawsuit against the provider. The attorney often will not know
if the provider was, in fact, negligent at the outset of the case.
Note, too, a claimant may be more willing to accept high fees and costs for
a lawsuit (line D), as well as a prospect of little or no recovery (line E), if the
experience was so severe that the claimant has a goal other than a financial
recovery, such as justice, the desire to punish the provider, the desire to
prevent this outcome for others in the future, or the opportunity to speak out
against the provider or the medical system. This is one way a severe patient
outcome may increase the resources spent to investigate and to prosecute a
60. Cf. Dixon, supra note 10, at 45–47; Deborah Davis & William C. Follette, Foibles of
Witness Memory for Traumatic/High Profile Events, 66 J. AIR L. & COM. 1421, 1454–67
(discussing how trauma and stress impair memory in several ways); Deborah Davis, Markus
Kemmelmeier, & William C. Follette, Memory for Conversation on Trial, in HANDBOOK OF
HUMAN FACTORS IN LITIGATION 12–4, 12–5 (Y. Ian Noy & Waldemar Karwowski eds., 2004);
KAHNEMAN, supra note 26, at 203–04 (discussing outcome bias—the tendency in hindsight to
blame decision-makers for not avoiding a bad outcome).

2020]

TERMINATING HOPE

15

complaint against the provider, increasing the risks associated with an
adverse patient outcome.
Given these factors, one could reasonably predict three results. First, many
meritorious malpractice claims are never brought, because the estimated
gross value of the claims (line C) are estimated to be too small relative to the
expected costs and fees (line D). Second, the claims that are brought tend to
have high recoveries when they are successful (see lines B and C). Third, a
large fraction of the claims that are brought are unsuccessful, because the
probability of winning the case (line A) is so uncertain at the outset. The
available data conform to these predictions. The majority of patients who
suffer a medical injury due to a provider’s negligence do not sue.61 One study
found that for every malpractice claim brought, there were 7.6 incidents of
medical negligence causing adverse outcomes.62 Likewise, claimants often fail
to obtain a recovery, but a successful claim typically brings a substantial
recovery. One broad study of the malpractice claims from 1991 to 2005
showed that 78% of the claims that were initiated did not result in a payment
to the claimant, but the mean indemnity payment in successful claims was
$274,887.63 Another later study, using data through 2015, showed again that
only about a quarter of the claims resulted in an indemnity payment, but the
average payment in successful claims was $365,503.64 While one-third of the
indemnity payments between 2006 and 2015 were less than $100,000,
payments exceeding one million dollars accounted for 41.9% of the total of
the indemnity payments.65 The average trial award for successful claims
closed in 2015 was $1,121,815, though trial awards accounted for only 3.5%
of the total amount of indemnity payments.66 Additionally, claims that do not
involve a medical error are more likely to go to trial due to lack of settlement
than claims that do involve a medical error, though meritless claims rarely
result in a verdict for the claimant.67
61. Studdert et al., supra note 23, at 2025.
62. A. Russel Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due
to Negligence—Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study III, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 245
(1991).
63. Anupam B. Jena et al., Malpractice Risk According to Physician Specialty, 365 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 629, 629 (2011).
64. Jose R. Guardado, Medical Professional Liability Insurance Indemnity Payments,
Expenses and Claim Disposition, 2006–2015, AM. MED. ASS’N POL’Y RES. PERSP., at 2–3 (2018),
https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/public/government/
advocacy/policy-research-perspective-liability-insurance-claim.pdf.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Studdert et al., supra note 23, at 2028.
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Returning to the theme of defensive medicine, providers respond to this
risk of lawsuits and to high malpractice insurance premiums by practicing
defensive medicine. For instance, a 2017 survey of 601 primary care providers
and specialists found that 86% of them believed that the fear of malpractice
was a reason for ordering unnecessary tests or procedures.68 Concerns about
liability may also influence the education of medical students and young
providers, perpetuating and institutionalizing inappropriate medical
practices.69
In short, while malpractice litigation is intended to compensate victims of
medical negligence, providers reasonably wish to avoid such suits, whether
the claims are ultimately successful or not. A substantial adverse patient
outcome creates the risk of a malpractice claim, regardless of the provider’s
responsibility. Providers therefore try to avoid adverse outcomes through the
practice of defensive medicine.
II. DEFENSIVE MEDICINE IN CASES OF POOR PRENATAL DIAGNOSES
Part I of this Article examines defensive medicine generally in its social
context. This Part of the Article looks more closely at defensive medicine in
the context of poor prenatal diagnoses. It argues that specific social, scientific,
legal, and ethical difficulties attending poor prenatal diagnoses give providers
reasons to go beyond discussing terminating the pregnancy, and to actively
encourage the woman to do so.70
A.

Defensive Medicine in Obstetric Care

Obstetricians and gynecologists are generally recognized as having the
highest rate of malpractice claims among medical specialists.71 While only a
small fraction of this is likely tied to poor prenatal diagnoses, the general
concern about liability can contribute to a culture of defensive medicine in
68. Choosing Wisely, DataBrief: Findings from a National Survey of Physicians, AM.
BOARD INTERNAL MED. FOUND. 1, 5–6 (2017), http://www.choosingwisely.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/Summary-Research-Report-Survey-2017.pdf.
69. Alexius Cruz O’Malley, Preventing a Return to Twilight and Straightjackets: Using the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act as a Starting Point for Evidence-Based Obstetric
Reform in the United States, 8 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 295, 315–16 (2013).
70. See Buck, supra note 31, at 923 (noting that providers may not discuss alternatives
when they consider the risks or benefits not worth discussing or when they strongly support a
particular treatment option).
71. Jose R. Guardado, Medical Liability Claim Frequency Among U.S. Physicians, AM.
MED. ASS’N POL’Y RES. PERSP. 1, 8 (2017), https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/
corp/media-browser/public/government/advocacy/policy-research-perspective-medicalliability-claim-frequency.pdf.
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prenatal care. In a 2015 survey, nearly three-quarters (73.6%) of the
responding OB-GYNs reported that they had been sued.72 Each OB-GYN
who responded had experienced, on average, 2.59 claims.73 Approximately
forty percent of the claims with a result reported in the survey responses
involved payments on behalf of the medical provider, averaging nearly onehalf million dollars, with the average payment for a neurologically impaired
infant exceeding $1,000,000.74 Nearly half (49.7%) of the OB-GYNs
acknowledged they had altered their practices between 2012 and 2014 out of
fear of liability, including 23.8% who decreased the number of high-risk
obstetrics patients they accepted.75 Nearly forty percent (39.8%) claimed they
made adjustments to their practices between 2012 and 2014 based on the
affordability or the availability of liability insurance, including 13.6% that
decreased the number of high-risk obstetrics patients they accepted.76
Meanwhile, the cost of malpractice premiums for OB-GYNs vary widely.77 In
2014, these costs tended to exceed $100,000 annually in twelve states, with a
peak of $214,999 a year in New York.78 Survey data from 2015 indicate OBGYNs spent an incredible average of 10.6% of their gross income on liability
insurance premiums.79 In another study, reviewing data from 1991 to 2005,
obstetrics and gynecology accounted for eleven of the sixty-six awards in
excess of one million dollars that the study identified, more than any other
specialty.80 Another study found that malpractice claims against OB-GYNs

72. Andrea M. Carpentieri et al., Overview of the 2015 American Congress of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists’ Survey on Professional Liability 3, AM. CONG. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND
GYNECOLOGISTS (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.acog.org/-/media/Departments/ProfessionalLiability/2015PLSurveyNationalSummary11315.pdf; see also Guardado, supra note 71, at 8
(reporting that 63.6% of responding OB-GYNs reported having been sued).
73. Carpentieri et al., supra note 72, at 3.
74. Id. at 4.
75. Id. at 3; see also Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 2612 (reporting that 59% of OB-GYNs
indicated they often referred patients to other specialists in unnecessary circumstances).
76. Carpentieri et al., supra note 72, at 1–2.
77. How Much Does Medical Malpractice Insurance Cost?, GALLAGHER HEALTHCARE:
INDUS. INSIGHTS BLOG (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.gallaghermalpractice.com/blog/post/howmuch-does-medical-malpractice-insurance-cost.
78. Id.; see also Jose R. Guardado, Medical Professional Liability Insurance Premiums: An
Overview of the Market from 2006 to 2017, AM. MED. ASS’N POL’Y RES. PERSP. 1 (2018),
https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/public/government/
advocacy/policy-research-perspective-liability-insurance-premiums.pdf.
79. Carpentieri et al., supra note 72, at 2.
80. Jena et al., supra note 63, at 633.
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were the most likely to be litigated.81 Thus, fear of litigation, high malpractice
premiums, and the practice of defensive medicine are common and acute in
obstetric care.
B.

Practical Difficulties of Poor Prenatal Diagnoses

Negotiating the risks of civil lawsuits can be particularly difficult in
obstetrics and other medical disciplines involving pregnancy because of the
medicolegal conflicts that can arise.82 In obstetrics, the doctor has two
patients, one wholly dependent on the other, with interrelated medical
conditions that may come into conflict with one another.83 Additionally, in
the United States, the mother has a broad right to terminate the prenatal life
at will.84 Pregnancies that pose a substantial risk to the health or life of the
mother represent particularly troubling cases, but the broad right to abort

81. Anupam B. Jena et al., Outcomes of Medical Malpractice Litigation Against US
Physicians, 172 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 892, 893 (2012).
82. See Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’ Orders: Unmasking the Doctor’s
Fiduciary Role in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 451 (2000).
83. Frati et al., supra note 4, at 339–40.
84. The prevailing legal standards were articulated in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). States may regulate and even prohibit abortion at
or after fetal viability except where abortion is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for
the preservation of the life or health of the mother. Id. at 879. Pre-viability regulations are
legitimate only if they do not impose an undue burden on the right to abortion. Id. at 878. An
undue burden exists if the purpose or effect of the regulation is to place a substantial obstacle
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. Id. Regulations to further the health or safety of
the woman, to promote the state’s interest in prenatal life, to ensure the decision to abort is an
informed decision, or to persuade a woman not to have the abortion, are also judged by the
undue burden standard. Id.
The guarantee of the right to a post-viability abortion to preserve the life or health of the
mother may be fairly broad. The life and health of the mother exception was articulated in Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1973), and explained in the companion case of Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179, 191–92 (1973). Bolton held that “the medical judgment [concerning the need for
the abortion for the life and health of the mother] may be exercised in the light of all factors—
physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—relevant to the well-being
of the patient. All these factors may relate to health.” Id. at 192.
Most states, in fact, place substantial limitations on late-term abortions, either at fetal
viability, or in the third trimester, or after a specified number of weeks. State Bans on Abortion
Throughout Pregnancy, GUTTMACHER INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/print/state-policy/
explore/state-policies-later-abortions (last visited Dec. 11, 2019). As of December 1, 2019,
twenty-six states have post-viability abortion bans in effect that limit the woman’s health
exception to physical health, and two states have laws in effect that do not include a health of
the mother exception. Id.
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such pregnancies and the general social acceptance of such abortions mitigate
some of the difficulties in practice.85
Cases involving a poor prenatal diagnosis without a risk to the mother are
often extremely complicated to address at a practical level. First, many severe
conditions can be detected in utero but cannot be cured, whether before or
after birth, and some may cause fetal demise.86 Options for prenatal and
postnatal interventions are expanding, but abortion may be the only option
to avoid the burdens of bearing a child expected to die in utero or shortly
after birth, or bearing and raising a child with special needs.87 In cases where
prenatal or postnatal treatment may be an option, practical considerations—
such as the cost of the treatment, the inconvenience, the risk to the mother’s
health, the risk of a premature birth, and other potential side effects—may
preclude treatment.88
Second, prior to the adverse diagnosis, the family typically expects the
child to be born healthy. A common mantra of expectant mothers is, “As long
as my child has ten fingers and ten toes, I am happy.” Even when family
medical history or prior genetic screenings suggest an adverse condition is
possible, the family may hope for the best and suppress fears and doubts.89
The family is often unprepared for an adverse prenatal diagnosis, and a bad
diagnosis and prognosis is likely to cause an emotional shock.90 The family
85. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (guaranteeing the right to abortion to save the life of the
mother); GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 84 (indicating that every state that bans late-term
abortion has a life of the mother exception); Legality of Abortion, 2018–2019 Demographic
Tables, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/244097/legality-abortion-2018-demographictables.aspx (last visited Nov. 19, 2019) (indicating only 18% of the respondents wanted
abortion to be illegal under all circumstances, and 35% wanted abortion to be legal in only a
few circumstances). The issue of early-term abortions on the basis of adverse prenatal
diagnoses recently garnered attention after Indiana sought to prohibit them. The law was
invalidated by a panel of the Seventh Circuit, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari on that
issue. Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana & Kentucky, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780 (2019).
86. Frati et al., supra note 4, at 339.
87. Id. at 342.
88. Id.
89. See Penelope Pitt, Belinda J. McClaren, & Jan Hodgson, Embodied Experiences of
Prenatal Diagnosis of Fetal Abnormality and Pregnancy Termination, 24 REPROD. HEALTH
MATTERS 168, 171 (2016) (“Melinda, who had previously terminated a pregnancy for a fetal
abnormality, described receiving the news at her 12 week scan that her current pregnancy had
abnormalities as ‘looking down the barrel of another termination.’”).
90. Himar H. Bijma et al., Decision-Making After Ultrasound Diagnosis of Fetal
Abnormality, 16 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 82, 84–86 (2008); Tommy Carlsson & Elisabet
Mattsson, Emotional and Cognitive Experiences During the Time of Diagnosis and DecisionMaking Following a Prenatal Diagnosis: A Qualitative Study of Males Presented with
Congenital Heart Defect in the Fetus Carried by Their Pregnant Partner, 18 BMC PREGNANCY
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must adjust to a new and adverse reality.91 The family may need to grieve.92
At the same time, critical decisions often must be made related to the
pregnancy, including whether to terminate the pregnancy.93 This is hardly an
ideal mindset for decision-making. The family may look to the medical
professional delivering the bad news for a specific recommendation,
elevating the provider’s role to that of a surrogate decision-maker.
Third, regardless of the doctor’s moral values, the doctor is obliged (at
least as a practical matter) to advise the woman that she has the option to
terminate the pregnancy through abortion, unless the law prohibits the
abortion in the circumstance.94 Some states prohibit some second- or thirdtrimester abortions unless the woman’s health or life is in jeopardy.95 If the
woman has a legal right to the abortion under the circumstance, however, the
doctor must treat abortion as a valid medical option, even if the doctor will
decline to perform the abortion.96 A provider risks a malpractice lawsuit if he
or she fails to advise the woman that abortion is an option when there is
evidence of a fetal anomaly and the woman can lawfully obtain an abortion
in the state.97 The potential damages in the case could be substantial,
increasing the risk a suit would be brought.98
Fourth, in states that regulate such abortions later in the pregnancy,
providers face the additional challenge of a time constraint. As of December
& CHILDBIRTH 26 (2018); Joan G. Lalor et al., Unexpected Diagnosis of Fetal Abnormality:
Women’s Encounters with Caregivers, 34 BIRTH 80, 83–86 (2007); Pitt, McClaren, & Hodgson,
supra note 89, at 171; Stina Lou et al., Parental Response to Severe or Lethal Prenatal Diagnosis:
A Systematic Review of Qualitative Studies, 37 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 731 (2017); see Tommy
Carlsson et al., Involvement of Persons with Lived Experience of a Prenatal Diagnosis of
Congenital Heart Defect: An Explorative Study To Gain Insights into Perspectives on Future
Research, 2 RES. INVOLVEMENT & ENGAGEMENT 1, 8 (2016).
91. Bijma et al., supra note 90, at 85; Dixon, supra note 10, at 47. Cf. KAHNEMAN, supra
note 26, at 302–304 (discussing the aversion to the loss, where the loss is an unrealized goal).
92. Bijma et al., supra note 90, at 85; Carlsson & Mattsson, supra note 90; Lalor et al.,
supra note 90, at 80–81.
93. Cf. Frati et al., supra note 4, at 342 (“In such circumstances, the pregnant woman is
asked to make decisions about her own medical care that unavoidably involves the health,
prognosis and even the possibility of survival of her unborn child. Women themselves might
find it difficult to decide for or against treatment.”).
94. See Bernstein, supra note 4, at 318–19. See generally Jackson, supra note 4 (discussing
the various classes of negligence actions that may arise in this context).
95. See supra note 84.
96. See Bernstein, supra note 4, at 318–19.
97. E.g., Simms v. United States, No. 3:11-0932, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174132, at *1–3
(S.D. W. Va. Dec. 17, 2014) (involving disputes about whether a woman was advised of her
right to terminate a pregnancy in conjunction with the adverse prenatal diagnosis).
98. See infra note 129.
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2019, forty-three states prohibit nontherapeutic abortions at some point in
the pregnancy, ranging from the twentieth week to about the twenty-sixth
week of the pregnancy.99 To give a concrete example, if the state prohibits
such abortions after twenty-four weeks, and the fetal anomaly is discovered
at twenty-two weeks, the provider has just two weeks to allow the woman to
recover from the shock, make the informed decision, and have the abortion,
if that is what she chooses.100
Fifth, diagnoses are often based on imperfect, ambiguous, or probabilistic
information that easily can be misunderstood.101 A classic case is Down
syndrome.102 The available tests for Down syndrome are not perfectly
accurate, and understanding the significance of the error rate is difficult. To
illustrate, if a test for Down syndrome has a sensitivity rate of 99.5%, then
approximately 5 of every 1000 mothers carrying a child with Down syndrome
will receive an erroneous negative reading if tested; the test misses the actual
existence of the condition 0.5% of the time.103 If the Down syndrome test has
a specificity rate of 99.9%, then approximately 1 in every 1,000 mothers who
receive a positive Down syndrome test result are, in fact, not carrying a child
with that condition; the test erroneously reports that the condition exists
0.1% of the time.104 The remaining 99.4% of the tests (994 of 1,000 tests)
produce accurate readings. While this seems highly reliable, the statistics are
misleading. In fact, a false positive is indistinguishable from a true positive,
and the true positives are some part of the approximately 994 accurate
readings. Suppose, for instance, that 100,000 pregnant women each has a 1
in 250 chance that her child in utero has Down syndrome.105 Approximately
400 of these pregnancies will therefore be affected with Down syndrome, and
approximately 99,600 pregnancies will not be affected. (The risk of Down
syndrome affecting the pregnancy increases exponentially with maternal age,
from approximately 1 in 1,600 pregnancies at the age of 20, to 1 in 30
pregnancies at the age of 45.106 Down syndrome is estimated as affecting
99. GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 84.
100. Frati et al., supra note 4, at 344.
101. Cf. Jackson, supra note 4, at 535–36 (referencing the inaccuracies of tests for Tay
Sachs).
102. See generally Dixon, supra note 10; Diehr, supra note 4, at 1305–10.
103. See Dixon, supra note 10, at 37.
104. See id.
105. Mark W. Leach, How Accurate Is the New Blood Test for Down Syndrome?, DOWN
SYNDROME PRENATAL TESTING (July 30, 2013), http://www.downsyndromeprenataltesting.
com/how-accurate-is-the-new-blood-test-for-down-syndrome/.
106. David S. Newberger, Down Syndrome: What You Need To Know When You’re
Pregnant, 62 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 837 (Aug. 15, 2000). Cf. Diehr, supra note 4, at 1305 (noting
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about 1 in every 500 pregnancies.107) Using the 99.9% sensitivity and 99.5%
selectivity rates, if all these women were tested, there would be approximately
360 accurate positive readings (Down syndrome correctly detected), only 40
erroneous negative readings (Down syndrome missed by the test), 100 false
positive readings (Down syndrome erroneously reported as detected), and
95,500 accurate negative readings (Down syndrome correctly determined not
to be present). The doctors that review the results and the mothers receiving
the results will see a negative reading in approximately 95,540 instances and
a positive reading in approximately 460 instances, without knowing if their
test produced a true or false result. In fact, approximately one of five women
who receive positive test results (21.74%—approximately 100 out of 460
positive readings) would not actually be carrying a child with Down syndrome;
these women received the false-positive test results.108 If a woman has a 1 in
500 chance that her child in utero has Down syndrome, a positive test result
will be a erroneous 35.71% of the time, based on a 99.9% specificity and a
99.5% sensitivity rate. Depending on the reasons for the false reading,
additional testing may produce repeated errors.109 The additional risk of
human error increases the possibility of an erroneous result being reported.110
Unfortunately, the abortion rate in cases of a Down syndrome diagnosis is
estimated to be as high as eighty to ninety percent, and all women, no matter

that the chance of having a baby with Down syndrome is above 1 in 250 at age thirty-five)
(quoting Len Leshin, Prenatal Screening for Down Syndrome, DOWN SYNDROME: HEALTH
ISSUES (1995), http://www.ds-health.com/prenatal.htm); Dixon, supra note 10, at 10 (asserting
the risk of Down syndrome afflicting the pregnancy of a woman who is thirty-five is 1 in 385,
and the risk of her having a fetus with other anomalies is 1 in 434, making her total risk of
chromosomal anomaly 1 in 204).
107. Jean Gekas et al., Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing for Fetal Chromosome Abnormalities:
Review of Clinical and Ethical Issues, 9 APPLICATION CLINICAL GENETICS 15, 15 (2016).
108. See Leach, supra note 105; cf. Hoffman, supra note 45, at 994–97 (discussing this
failure to pay attention to base rates). In his book THE DRUNKARD’S WALK: HOW RANDOMNESS
RULES OUR LIVES 114–16 (2008), theoretical physicist Leonard Mlodinow illustrates this
surprising truth of statistics with a personal story. He describes that in 1989, he tested positive
for HIV. His doctor advised him the test returned false positives in only 1 of 1,000 instances,
and his doctor concluded that Mlodinow had only a 1 in 1,000 chance of being healthy given
the positive test. According to Mlodinow’s calculations, however, since a person with his
characteristics has only a 1 in 10,000 chance of being HIV positive, he actually had a 10 out of
11 chance that he was not HIV positive despite the positive test.
109. See Dixon, supra note 10, at 36.
110. See id. at 40–41; Brandy Zadrozny, Parents Sue Doctors over “Wrongful Abortion,”
DAILY BEAST (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.thedailybeast.com/parents-sue-doctors-overwrongful-abortion/ (allegation that human error caused an erroneous diagnosis of an intersex
fetus).
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their age, are encouraged to undergo Down syndrome screening.111 Thus, the
harms arising from even small error rates may be greatly exaggerated by poor
comprehension of what those error rates mean.
Even where the diagnosis is relatively certain, though, there may be
insufficient information for a reasonably accurate prognosis.112 Medicine’s
ability to detect conditions that typify serious special needs far exceeds
medicine’s ability to specify what those special needs will be, much less what
the condition will mean for the day-to-day life of the family or the affected
individual.113 As one author notes:
[T]he range of functioning among individuals with the same
disabilities can vary dramatically. An individual with Down
syndrome, for example, may be profoundly mentally
retarded and severely restricted in motor functioning or may
be capable of meaningful employment, relationships, and
community engagement. A child with cystic fibrosis likewise
might die from it, survive with physical disability, or suffer
no noticeable impairment.114
Any parent facing a poor prenatal diagnosis for a child, though, will want
the doctor to describe what the diagnosis will mean in practice in the
future.115 This dynamic encourages medical professionals to speak to matters
beyond the scope of their expertise, presenting what may be incomplete or
incarnate information, or speaking with greater confidence than a fair view
of the situation merits.116
Sixth, in these situations, the pregnant woman facing a poor prenatal
diagnosis may feel a strong sense of isolation.117 The choice to have an
abortion or not is legally hers and hers alone, regardless of the desires of

111. Diehr, supra note 4, at 1289, 1301, 1306. But see Dixon, supra note 10, at 5–7 (arguing
that the estimate of 90% may be too high); Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139
S. Ct. 1780, 1782, 1790–91 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing a Washington Post article
that placed the abortion rate at 67% for Down syndrome diagnoses in the United States).
112. Diehr, supra note 4, at 1311.
113. E.g., Dixon, supra note 10, at 37–38.
114. Hensel, supra note 7, at 183 (footnotes omitted).
115. See Lalor et al., supra note 90, at 83–86.
116. Dixon, supra note 10, at 4, 21–24, 27.
117. Denise Côté-Arsenault & Erin Denney-Koelsch, “My Baby Is a Person”: Parents’
Experiences with Life-Threatening Fetal Diagnosis, 14 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 1302, 1304, 1306–07
(2011).
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others, including the father of the child.118 A medical provider must,
therefore, tailor the communications to the mother. The provider may
marginalize others in the woman’s decision-making process, whether
intentionally or not.119 The diagnosis, prognosis, and option to terminate the
pregnancy may also be presented to the woman in a setting in which she is
physically isolated from those she may look to for advice, including family
members that are not present, other medical providers, or spiritual
counselors. This may induce her to rely on the medical provider as her sole
or chief advisor in the matter.
Seventh and finally, as intimated above, the provider’s risk of a lawsuit for
failing to advise a woman of the right to an abortion is not wholly eliminated
by actually advising the woman of the right to the abortion. Given the
emotional shock of a poor prenatal diagnosis, the parents may not have a
clear recollection of the conversation that follows.120 This memory lapse may
lead to a lawsuit if the family continues the pregnancy to term but claims the
provider withheld information that would have induced the woman to
terminate the pregnancy.121 As discussed above, even if it will be difficult to
prove a breach in the standard of care because of the factual dispute, a lawyer
may well take the case because of the potential for a large verdict. Also, as
described above, the lawsuit itself causes many hardships for the provider,
whether the provider wins or loses.
The civil tort claims associated with poor prenatal diagnoses and the birth
of children with special needs are a familiar subject in legal journals.122 The
nomenclature of these claims—“wrongful birth,” “wrongful life,” and
118. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887–
96 (1992) (invalidating a spousal notification law as unduly burdening the woman’s right to
an abortion); Lalor et al., supra note 90, at 86.
119. Lalor et al., supra note 90, at 85.
120. See Carlsson et al., supra note 90, at 6–8; Tommy Carlsson et al., Experiences of
Informational Needs and Received Information Following a Prenatal Diagnosis of Congenital
Heart Defect, 36 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 515, 517–20 (2016).
121. Cf., e.g., Simms v. United States, No. 3:11-0932, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174132, at *1–
3 (S.D. W. Va. Dec. 17, 2014) (involving disputes about whether a woman was advised of her
right to terminate a pregnancy in conjunction with the adverse prenatal diagnosis).
122. See generally, e.g., Jackson, supra note 4 (discussing the various classes of negligence
actions that may arise in this context). See Constance Frisby Fain, Wrongful Life: Legal and
Medical Aspects, 75 KY. L.J. 585, 587–88 (1986); Frati et al., supra note 4, at 343; Hensel, supra
note 7; Mogill, supra note 4, at 827–28; Schuster, supra note 4; Sheth, supra note 4, at 645;
Strasser, supra note 31, at 821–22; Brown, supra note 4; Bernstein, supra note 4; Diehr, supra
note 4, at 1295–1304; Foutz, supra note 4; Kennedy, supra note 4; Say, supra note 14; Kate
Wevers, Note, Prenatal Torts and Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
257 (2010).
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“wrongful pregnancy,” for instance—is more ambiguous than helpful for our
purposes, and some of these terms may be used for cases that do not involve
disabilities, let alone prenatally diagnosed disabilities.123 Simply put, if the
jurisdiction permits it, a medical provider who allegedly failed to disclose an
unfavorable fetal condition, or who allegedly failed to recommend abortion
adequately in the case, could be sued based on allegations that the failure
breached the standard of care and caused damages, namely the lost
opportunity to abort the pregnancy because of the disability.124 The plaintiff
in such a suit will typically be either or both parents or the child, depending
on the circumstances and what the state allows.125 When the woman has a
legal right to an elective abortion, which typically includes a eugenic
abortion,126 the claimant may allege that the provider’s failure to discuss the
123. See Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8, 9 n.3 (Mass. 1990) (“These labels are not
instructive. Any ‘wrongfulness’ lies not in the life, the birth, the conception, or the pregnancy,
but in the negligence of the physician. The harm, if any, is not the birth itself but the effect of
the defendant’s negligence on the parents’ physical, emotional, and financial well-being
resulting from the denial to the parents of their right, as the case may be, to decide whether to
bear a child or whether to bear a child with a genetic or other defect.”); Fain, supra note 122,
at 587–88 (noting that “a great deal of confusion has existed regarding the use of the term
‘wrongful life,’ with that label being given to a variety of factual situations” and describing
wrongful life suits not related to disabilities); Hensel, supra note 7, at 150–62, 164–66; Jackson,
supra note 4, at 566 (suggesting the “wrongful life” label is prejudicial to the merits of the cause
of action); Mogill, supra note 4, at 827–28 (discussing the additional terms of “wrongful
conception” and “wrongful pregnancy”); Sheth, supra note 4, at 645 (noting “jurists and
scholars do not always use the terms consistently”); Strasser, supra note 31 (discussing the
subtle distinctions among the states’ treatment of wrongful conception and wrongful
pregnancy, wrongful birth, and wrongful life, and practical difficulties in distinguishing one
claim from another); Foutz, supra note 4, at 483–84, 488–98; Kennedy, supra note 4, at 482–
90; Say, supra note 14, at 261, 264.
124. Wevers, supra note 122, at 263–66. See generally Fain, supra note 122, at 587–614
(discussing wrongful life suits); Hensel, supra note 7, at 142–44, 164–70; Jackson, supra note
4 (discussing the various classes of negligence actions that may arise in this context); Bernstein,
supra note 4, at 299; Diehr, supra note 4, at 1287–88; Foutz, supra note 4; Say, supra note 14,
at 266.
125. Fain, supra note 122, at 585–86; Hensel, supra note 7, at 142–44; Bernstein, supra
note 4, at 300–02; Diehr, supra note 4, at 1287–88, 1295–98; Foutz, supra note 4, at 483–84;
Schuster, supra note 4, at 2337–38.
126. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Ind. State Dep’t of Health,
888 F.3d 300, 303, 305–06 (7th Cir. 2018) (invalidating a state law prohibiting abortions based
on race, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, or diagnosis or potential diagnosis), vacated in
part, 727 Fed. App’x 208 (7th Cir.), vacated, 917 F.3d 532 (7th Cir.), rev’d in part, Box v.
Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780 (2019). In this case, on a petition for
certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Thomas argued in a concurrence, “The Court’s
decision to allow further percolation [on the issue of state bans on abortions based on race,
sex, or disability] should not be interpreted as agreement with the decisions below. Enshrining
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adverse condition or the abortion option adequately was a proximate cause
of the child being born alive.127 Damages in these suits may include, but are
not necessarily limited to, the extraordinary expenses of caring for the
child.128 The damage award can easily run into the millions, depending on the
child’s condition, even when the family has private insurance that will absorb
a portion of these expenses or require medical providers to reduce their
charges.129
The imprecise language used in case law and statutes, the evolving nature
of the law, and distinctions among the legal standards employed across the
nation make it difficult to detail precisely in which jurisdictions, and under
what circumstances, a medical provider might be sued for the birth of a child

a constitutional right to an abortion based solely on the race, sex, or disability of an unborn
child, as Planned Parenthood advocates, would constitutionalize the views of the 20th–century
eugenics movement.” Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1792
(2019) (Thomas, J., concurring).
127. E.g., Simms v. United States, No. 3:11–0932, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174132, at *1, *9–
10 (S.D. W. Va. Dec. 17, 2014) (involving disputes about whether a woman was advised of her
right to terminate a pregnancy in conjunction with the adverse prenatal diagnosis).
128. See generally Belsky, supra note 44, at 196–205 (discussing the damages allowed by
law under the various claims); Bernstein, supra note 4, at 306; Brown, supra note 4, at 864;
Diehr, supra note 4, at 1293–94; Fain, supra note 122, at 590; Frati et al., supra note 4, at 343–
44; Hensel, supra note 7, at 150–62; Jackson, supra note 4; Kennedy, supra note 4, at 489;
Mogill, supra note 4, at 828–31, 842–72; Schuster, supra note 4, at 2336; Wevers, supra note
122, at 264–66.
129. E.g., Simms v. United States, 839 F.3d 364, 370 (4th Cir. 2016) (reviewing a
$12,222,743 wrongful birth award, and finding the trial court correctly used the amount the
hospital charged for the services, rather than the amount Medicaid paid, but remanding for a
statutory post-verdict collateral source hearing); Wilkie v. Aslam, No. BPG-08-1425, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 97503, at *13–14 (D. Md. Oct. 21, 2009) (rejecting the argument that a wrongful
birth damage award is to be reduced by the amount paid for the child through public assistance
programs); Wuth v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 359 P.3d 841 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (upholding a
verdict totaling $50,000,000 on wrongful birth and wrongful life claims); Chamberland v.
Physicians for Women’s Health, LLC, No. CV010164040S, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 451
(Conn. Super. Ct. 2006) (upholding a $12,000,000 wrongful birth award, plus interest, subject
to a $428,937.70 collateral source deduction); Demetrios C. Batsides & Melissa S. Geller, The
Cross-Border Dilemma: Wrongful-Birth and -Life Litigation in NJ, N.J. L.J. (May 11, 2016, 3:42
PM), https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/almID/1202757420585/ (indicating that reported
New Jersey settlements and verdicts in such cases have “almost always exceeded $1 million
and have often ranged between $2.5 million and $10 million”); Andrew G. Slutkin, Wrongful
Birth…, MD. MED. MALPRACTICE LAW. BLOG (July 1, 2010), https://www.marylandmedical
malpracticelawyerblog.com/wrongful_birth_in_maryland_ver/ (referencing a $7.1 million
wrongful birth verdict); Verdicts & Settlements, O’CONNOR, PARSONS, LANE & NOBLE,
http://lawnj.net/verdicts/28million-wrongful-birth/ (describing a $28 million verdict for a
wrongful birth claim) (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
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with special needs.130 Many states have declined to recognize such claims, at
least at this point, and many state legislatures have enacted laws prohibiting
such suits in one manner or another.131 Currently, though, four states allow
lawsuits against a medical provider by a person that claims he or she should
have been aborted.132 About half of the states recognize suits brought by the
mother, and possibly the father and other family members, against the
medical provider after the birth of a child that the mother claims she would
have aborted had she known of the child’s adverse condition.133
C.

The Practical Effects of These Difficulties

In each communication with a family about a poor prenatal diagnosis or
prognosis, and particularly in reporting the initial bad news, the provider has
to determine how to share the information. The factors outlined above will
affect this decision. With respect to terminating the pregnancy, the doctor is
typically obliged to discuss the option, so the question is not “Do I discuss it?”
but rather, “Do I recommend it?” (the third factor).134 This decision may shape
the entire discussion. There may be no realistic option to treat the condition
(the first factor). Terminating the pregnancy in such cases will often appear
an appealing and even a merciful option, at least compared to either the
unexpected prospect of caring for a disabled child and the uncertainty about
how difficult the child’s and the family’s future will be, or alternatively the
prospect of continuing the burdens of a pregnancy in which the child is likely
to die in utero (the second factor). Moreover, if the provider expects the
family to choose abortion, emphasizing the adverse prognosis may be
psychologically beneficial and even therapeutic, by reducing doubts about
the decision.135 In states that restrict late-term nontherapeutic abortions, the
130. See Bernstein, supra note 4, at 307–10 (discussing Nevada’s and Indiana’s refusal to
adopt the “wrongful life” label for such claims); Strasser, supra note 31, at 833 (discussing the
subtle distinctions among the states’ treatment of wrongful conception and wrongful
pregnancy, wrongful birth, and wrongful life, and practical difficulties in distinguishing one
claim from another).
131. Bernstein, supra note 4, at 311–15; Frati et al., supra note 4, at 344; Say, supra note
14, at 261–64.
132. Diehr, supra note 4, at 1297 & n.80 (identifying California, New Jersey, Washington,
and Maine); Schuster, supra note 4, at 2336.
133. Diehr, supra note 4, at 1297 (asserting twenty-three state recognize wrongful birth
actions); Frati et al., supra note 4, at 344 (listing twenty-four states); Say, supra note 14, at 261
n.70 (citing cases from twenty-four jurisdictions).
134. See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 499–500.
135. See Majike Korenromp, Parental Adaptation to Termination of Pregnancy for Fetal
Anomalies 20, 22, 26, 34–35, 40, 43, 46, 50, 54, 60, 66, 69, 76, 82, 85–86, 94–95, 110, 126–27,
132–37, 140 (2006), https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/9774.
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doctor may be obliged to press for a prompt or immediate decision (the
fourth factor). Psychological or physical isolation of the woman in the
decision-making process can make her vulnerable to the influence of the
medical provider, whether that is the medical provider’s intention or not (the
sixth factor).136 Imperfect information as to either the diagnosis or the
prognosis, or both, also allows the medical provider to interpret and present
the data as the provider may choose in answering the critical question of
“What’s going to happen?” (the fifth factor).
In this context, the risks associated with a lawsuit or other disciplinary
action (the seventh factor) can further incentivize the provider to
recommend an abortion.137 Abortion eliminates the risk of wrongful birth or
wrongful life suits by excluding the precondition of the suit, namely the child
being born alive.138 Abortion practically eliminates the risk of negligence
claims or disciplinary complaints based on an erroneous diagnosis or
prognosis—such as a false positive on the Down syndrome test, or an
erroneous prediction that the disability will be severe—because the error
would not likely be discovered once the abortion occurs.139 If the error is
discovered and disclosed before the abortion, the woman typically has not
suffered legally compensable harm. The risk of injury to the woman through
the abortion can be addressed through signed consent forms disclosing the
risk.140 This risk also falls on the abortion provider, who might not be the
person that recommends the abortion. Moreover, even if the medical
provider is successfully sued for recommending an abortion, the damages
136. Dixon, supra note 10, at 39–40; see Lalor et al., supra note 90, at 85–86.
137. See Bernstein, supra note 4, at 318–19; Diehr, supra note 4, at 1289; Dixon, supra
note 10, at 39–40, 51–53; Fain, supra note 122, at 626–29 (noting that doctors are concerned
about wrongful life suits); Jeffrey Klagholz & Albert L. Strunk, Overview of the 2009 ACOG
Survey on Professional Liability, ACADEMIA, https://www.academia.edu/707493/Overview_
of_the_2009_ACOG_survey_on_professional_liability (last visited Nov. 20, 2019); see also
Ronen Perry & Yehuda Adar, Wrongful Abortion: A Wrong in Search of a Remedy, 5 YALE J.
HEALTH POL. L. & ETHICS 507, 523–24, 544–47 (2005) (arguing that the law currently does not
provide an adequate incentive to providers to abstain from giving inaccurate information that
may lead to an unnecessary abortion). Recommending abortion in such instances to mitigate
the risks associated with the birth of a special needs child is an example of substituting one
method of care for another, as discussed by Schlanger, supra note 25. In fact, this is roughly
equivalent to a substitution that Schlanger describes as “not entirely plausible,” namely
selecting death over a severe injury to a potential plaintiff. Id. at 530.
138. Hensel, supra note 7, at 165–67; Kennedy, supra note 4, at 484.
139. Perry & Adar, supra note 137, at 546–47. But see infra, Part III.
140. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 66–67 (1976)
(upholding a law requiring a woman to sign a written consent form detailing the risks
associated with an abortion).
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awarded may be substantially less than a suit if the child were born alive and
with disabilities.141
Beyond merely discussing or recommending abortion, the medical
provider is incentivized to persuade the woman to accept the abortion.142
After all, if the provider merely recommends an abortion, and the woman
declines, the provider may face substantially the same legal and disciplinary
actions if the woman does not recall the conversation or claims the provider
did not do enough to explain the dire situation.143 Moreover, persuasion can
be accomplished subtly.144 The diagnosis and prognosis might be framed to
emphasize the probability of fetal demise or the low expected quality of life
for the child.145 Uncertainty about the future and the attendant feeling of a
loss of control may easily motivate the woman to agree to an induced
abortion.146 The cost and difficulty to the family of providing medical care
might be discussed. Moral or religious objections, or emotional aversion to
abortion, might be minimized by framing this as an extraordinary case. The
woman might be gently pressed for a prompt decision, minimizing the time
she has to overcome the initial shock or to connect with personal, medical,
or spiritual advisors.147 The provider may justify these communications,
professionally and personally, reasoning that the woman has to be prepared
for the worst, that more details would be overwhelming, that the family will
suffer less mental distress with an abortion if they have fewer doubts as to the
need to terminate the pregnancy, and that termination is the right decision.148
141. See Perry & Adar, supra note 137, at 518–22, 544–47 (discussing the limited damages
that would be awarded in a wrongful abortion case, as compared to other suits).
142. See Diehr, supra note 4.
143. Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6(b) (2019) (“The failure or refusal of a parent to prevent the
live birth of his or her child shall not be a defense in any action against a third party, nor shall
the failure or refusal be considered in awarding damages in any such action.”); Troppi v. Scarf,
187 N.W.2d 511, 519–20 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (rejecting the argument, in a case involving a
pharmacists’ malpractice in failing to provide contraceptives, that the family should have
mitigated its damages by placing the child for adoption); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260
N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977) (rejecting the argument that parents should have mitigated
their damages by aborting an unplanned pregnancy arising from a failed vasectomy).
144. See Buck, supra note 31, at 923; Dixon, supra note 10, at 32–34, 40–45.
145. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 26, at 88, 363–70 (discussing the influence of framing on
human choices); Diehr, supra note 4, at 1289.
146. See Bijma et al., supra note 90, at 85.
147. See Dixon, supra note 10, at 42–43.
148. See Frati et al., supra note 4, at 352 (“We would like to stress that the duty to inform
should be tempered by maternal desire. The role of information assumes particularly complex
meaning when the choice of the mother affects others (the unborn baby or newborn, father,
siblings), including the physician whose conduct has influenced this choice.”); Korenromp,
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Indeed, some states have recognized a therapeutic privilege allowing
providers to withhold information from the patient if, in the provider’s
assessment, the disclosure would do more harm to the patient than good.149
One must question whether any particular woman can give informed
consent for the abortion in such circumstances, especially if she is pressed for
a prompt decision, independent of other personal, medical, or spiritual
advisors, and especially if she was predisposed to reject abortion in such cases
prior to the emotional shock of the diagnosis or prognosis.150 That being said,
an attorney would hesitate to sue a doctor alleging lack of informed consent
when consent is documented because (1) it is difficult to overcome the legal
significance of a signed consent form, (2) the court may determine that a
competently performed abortion is not a legally cognizable injury despite an
inadequate disclosure, and (3) the amount of the monetary award, if the claim
is successful, would be extremely uncertain.151
In short, the medical provider could justify an attempt to eliminate the
family’s reasonable hope of a decent life for this child so as to induce the
woman to accept the abortion promptly, in part to mitigate the risks of
liability or other formal or informal punishment. This justification can be
used to excuse gross infringements of patient autonomy through
misinformation, incomplete information, or pressure tactics.152 In fact,
academic studies show many women that have chosen to continue the

supra note 135, at 20, 22, 26, 34–35, 40, 43, 46, 50, 54, 60, 66, 69, 76, 82, 85–86, 94–95, 110,
126–27, 132–37, 140.
149. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Logan v.
Greenwich Hosp. Ass’n, 465 A.2d 294, 300 (Conn. 1983); Cuc Thi Ngo v. Queen’s Med. Ctr.,
358 P.3d 26, 38 n.14 (Haw. 2015); Hondroulis v Schumacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 413 (La. 1989);
Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 700 (Minn. 1977); Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299, 301
(Tex. 1967).
150. Bijma et al., supra note 90, at 85; Buck, supra note 31, at 918–21; Diehr, supra note
4, at 1301–02; Dixon, supra note 10, at 4. See Emma F. France et al., What Parents Say About
Disclosing the End of Their Pregnancy Due to Fetal Abnormality, 29 MIDWIFERY 24, 25, 27, 30
(2013) (noting that some interviewed after terminating a pregnancy due to an adverse prenatal
diagnosis “chose [to disclose the situation to others using] language to convey their perceived
lack of choice over the decision.”).
151. See Buck, supra note 31, at 919; Curran, supra note 10, at 135–39, 149–54, 157.
152. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“The physician’s
privilege to withhold information for therapeutic reasons must be carefully circumscribed,
however, for otherwise it might devour the disclosure rule itself. The privilege does not accept
the paternalistic notion that the physician may remain silent simply because divulgence might
prompt the patient to forego therapy the physician feels the patient really needs.”).
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pregnancy despite the adverse diagnosis are disappointed with the manner in
which the diagnosis was delivered and in the subsequent support provided.153
While one might assume this would only be a concern in states that permit
suits for the birth of a child with special needs, the influence of these suits
extends beyond the border of those states. Some practitioners may not know
their state laws and operate on the assumption that they can be sued.
Individual providers that develop defensive medical practices in a
jurisdiction that permits such suits may not adapt those practices when they
move to a new state, or when state law changes. Providers who treat patients
from other states may be subject to suit under the rules of the other state.154
Moreover, educational institutions and national professional associations
may promote a national standard of practice based in part on the risk of
lawsuits in the hostile jurisdictions.155 Matthew Diehr points, for instance, to
the practice guidelines promulgated by the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists in 2007, recommending that all pregnant
women should be screened to determine if the pregnancy is afflicted with
certain congenital conditions, including Down syndrome and other
conditions that cannot be treated in utero.156 As such, even in states that
prohibit such lawsuits, practitioners may still be influenced to practice
defensive medicine in response to poor prenatal diagnoses.
In summary, addressing any adverse prenatal fetal diagnosis with the
family poses complex practical challenges for medical providers, but the
current medicolegal arrangement encourages providers to promote abortion
in cases of an adverse prenatal diagnoses, even at the cost of informed
decision-making. As noted, the diagnosis may not be accurate, but even if it
is reliable, the providers often cannot provide a reliable and specific
prognosis as to how this particular child will be affected by the condition
detected. Both the nature and severity of the child’s future functional
limitations are typically in doubt. Nevertheless, legal and professional
obligations and risks, and the emotional dynamics of the situation, encourage
providers to persuade the woman to terminate the pregnancy, even if the
diagnosis or prognosis is doubtful or speculative. After all, errors of
specificity—that is, recommending abortion based on a false-positive
153. Lalor et al., supra note 90, at 81.
154. Cf. Lab. Corp. of Am. v. Hood, 911 A.2d 841, 842–43 (Md. 2006) (applying Maryland
law to a wrongful birth case against North Carolina medical laboratories); Fonda v. Wapner,
No. 109244/09, 2012 N.Y Misc. LEXIS 667, at *33–34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 15, 2012) (applying
Colorado law to a Philadelphia physician that practices in New York in a wrongful birth case),
aff’d, 103 A.D.3d 510 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
155. Diehr, supra note 4, at 1304–12, 1317–18.
156. Id.
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diagnosis or on an erroneously adverse prognosis—carry a small risk of realworld consequence for the medical provider compared to errors of
sensitivity—failing to detect and disclose an adverse condition while abortion
is still an option. Medical providers are better off predicting the worst
possible outcome, purposefully extinguishing the reasonable and legitimate
hopes of the family. If the pregnancy is aborted, everyone can assume the
provider’s predictions were accurate, excusing the family’s decision.
Moreover, if the woman continues the pregnancy, the outcome will not be
worse than the provider predicted, mitigating the perception of a bad
outcome attributable to the provider. Even in jurisdictions that prohibit such
lawsuits, practitioners may be influenced by the public policy of the states
that allow such suits, whether through ignorance of the local law, personal
practices not specifically adapted to a particular state’s policy, or national
practice standards designed to protect practitioners in hostile jurisdictions.157

157. Johnson provides an excellent commentary:
The doctor may be wrong about what the law requires or prohibits,
yet the doctor’s understanding of the law is honestly asserted. Non-expert
individuals dealing with an extensive body of rules that govern their
actions on a daily basis do not ordinarily seek legal counsel and instead
rely substantially on informal, word-of-mouth sources. At a very early
point, the time and expense required to secure a more authoritative
description of the law simply makes the effort impractical and unbearable.
Any rule-oriented system, in which the specific rules are not easily
accessible to those bound by them, will experience a similar informal,
underground communication network.
In their clinical decision making, physicians are more likely to turn to
physician colleagues for advice rather than referring to journal articles or
other decision supports. This same pattern may operate in their seeking
advice as to the legal requirements for their practice, crowding out counsel
from persons with more legal expertise. Intuitively as well, one has to
believe that doctors trust other doctors more than they do lawyers.
Doctors value clinical experience rather than rules and guidelines in
treatment decision making. This heuristic may operate in the context of
assessing legal risk and developing responsive behaviors as well. Thus, the
stories told by doctors about their own or others’ experiences with the law
take on even more power in part because they fit the learning and
evidence-gathering patterns generally familiar in medicine. In addition,
stories told within physician groups are likely to amplify extremes in terms
of the rendition of the facts of the case, as well as the view that the system
is offensive and unfair.
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III. MELENEY-DISTASSIO V. WEINSTEIN
Many of the concerns described in the preceding section are illustrated, by
example or counterexample, through the Connecticut case of MeleneyDistassio v. Weinstein, a recent “wrongful abortion” lawsuit.158 In this case,
the plaintiffs, a husband and a wife, sued the wife’s OB-GYN and a consulting
physician alleging the providers were liable for recommending that the wife
obtain an abortion.159 The couple had previous difficulties conceiving and
bringing a pregnancy to term.160 During the pregnancy at issue in the lawsuit,
a 3D ultrasound reportedly confirmed the fetus was developing club feet.161
The physicians were concerned this was the harbinger of a serious fetal
chromosomal abnormality, called Trisomy 18 syndrome.162
Trisomy 18 syndrome is a relatively common defect in a particular
chromosome—that is, an aberration in the person’s DNA.163 It can cause one
or more serious and potentially fatal congenital physical malformations.164
These might include, for instance, openings in the abdomen so the internal
organs are not contained, heart defects, and urinary tract defects preventing
When the rule is miscommunicated, it will have an impact quite
different from that intended, possibly to the disadvantage of the patient,
the doctor, and the public. Legal standards applicable to the medical
practice tend to be complex or fact-sensitive and, thus, are particularly
resistant to accurate mouth-to-mouth-to-mouth communication on the
grapevine. Yet, this informal communication network is the source of
choice for physicians for much of their information and learning about
legal requirements that affect their practice.
Johnson, supra note 9, at 994–95.
158. For other examples of wrongful abortion lawsuits arising from erroneous prenatal
diagnoses, see Johnson v. United States, 810 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1993) (HIV diagnosis); Breyne
v. Potter, 574 S.E.2d 916 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (Down syndrome diagnosis); Martinez v. Long
Island Jewish Hillside Med. Ctr., 512 N.E.2d 538 (N.Y. 1987) (microcephaly or anencephaly
diagnosis); Zadrozny, supra note 110 (intersex diagnosis).
159. Meleney-Distassio v. Weinstein, No. FSTCV136018746S, 2014 Conn. Super. LEXIS
2861, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2014).
160. Id. at *3–4.
161. See Neubert, Pepe & Monteith, P.C. Obtains Defense Verdict in Groundbreaking
Wrongful Fetal Termination Case, NEUBERT PEPE & MONTEITH P.C. (Nov. 2016),
http://www.npmlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Shevell-Stockman-Maiocco-1116.pdf
[hereinafter NPM Advisory].
162. Id.
163. Anna Cereda & John C. Carey, The Trisomy 18 Syndrome, ORPHANET JOURNAL OF
RARE DISEASES 1 (Oct. 23, 2012), https://ojrd.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/17501172-7-81.
164. Id.
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the bladder from being voided in utero.165 Pregnancies affected by Trisomy
18 often end in miscarriage or stillbirth due to these congenital
malformations, especially if the fetus is male.166 Most parents who receive a
Trisomy 18 prenatal diagnosis choose an elective abortion.167
The lawsuit alleged that on June 14, 2010, when the wife was twenty-one
weeks pregnant, the consulting physician performed an amniocentesis,
drawing amniotic fluid to test it for signs of the chromosomal abnormality.168
The following day, the laboratory issued a report to the physicians indicating
that the initial test result was positive for Trisomy 18.169 The report, however,
came with the warning that no irreversible therapeutic action should be taken
based on this preliminary result.170 A second, more reliable test was
pending.171
Connecticut law provided, “No abortion may be performed upon a
pregnant woman after viability of the fetus except when necessary to preserve
the life or health of the pregnant woman.”172 At twenty–one weeks, viability
was likely imminent.173 The law further specified, “The decision to terminate
a pregnancy prior to the viability of the fetus shall be solely that of the
pregnant woman in consultation with her physician.”174
The lawsuit alleged that on June 15, 2010, the OB-GYN contacted the wife
by telephone and advised her the test result indicated a serious chromosomal
defect that would result in fetal suffering and death before or shortly after
birth.175 The suit alleged that the OB-GYN urged the woman to terminate the
pregnancy immediately, before the law precluded her from doing so, and the
doctor provided the woman contact information for a clinic that could
perform the elective abortion.176 A prompt telephone call by the woman
showed the clinic could not perform the abortion immediately, and so the
consulting physician referred the woman to another physician, who
165. Id. at 1, 3.
166. Id. at 3–5.
167. Id. at 2–3.
168. Meleney-Distassio v. Weinstein, No. FSTCV136018746S, 2014 Conn. Super. LEXIS
2861, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2014).
169. See id. at *4.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at *1–2, n.1 (quoting CON. GEN. STAT. § 19a-602(b)).
173. Id. at *2, *5.
174. Meleney-Distassio v. Weinstein, No. FSTCV136018746S, 2014 Conn. Super. LEXIS
2861, at *1–2, n.1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2014) (quoting CON. GEN. STAT. § 19a-602(a)).
175. Id. at *1, *4.
176. Id. at *5.
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performed the abortion on June 16, 2010.177 The plaintiffs alleged they were
not provided the laboratory report, nor was the laboratory’s warning that
discouraged irreversible action communicated to them.178
On June 16, 2010, the laboratory allegedly called the consulting physician
and reported that it had experienced technical difficulties in the initial test,
and the results of that test were not reliable.179 The physician immediately
called the doctor that was to perform the abortion to communicate the news
to the wife, but the abortion had already been performed.180 A final report
issued by the laboratory on June 22 concluded there were no detectable
chromosomal abnormalities, noting the first test was considered preliminary
because of the risk of false positives.181 The plaintiffs alleged the consulting
physician later advised them the pregnancy would likely have resulted in the
birth of a healthy boy, had they not aborted the pregnancy.182 The couple filed
a lawsuit in September 2012, but the suit was dismissed on procedural
grounds in February 2013.183 The couple refiled the lawsuit the following
June.184
In a largely unprecedented decision, the trial court allowed both the
husband’s claim as well as the wife’s claim against the physicians to proceed,
over the defendants’ objections as to the husband’s standing to sue.185 The
state law, after all, vested the decision to undergo the abortion in the pregnant
woman alone, and the physician had no professional duty to the husband.186
177. Meleney-Distassio v. Weinstein, No. FSTCV136018746S, 2013 Conn. Super. LEXIS
2375, at *2–3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 16, 2013).
178. Meleney-Distassio v. Weinstein, No. FSTCV136018746S, 2014 Conn. Super. LEXIS
2861, at *5–6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2014).
179. Id.; Meleney-Distassio v. Weinstein, No. FSTCV136018746S, 2013 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 2375, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 16, 2013).
180. Meleney-Distassio v. Weinstein, No. FSTCV136018746S, 2014 Conn. Super. LEXIS
2861, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2014); Meleney-Distassio v. Weinstein, No.
FSTCV136018746S, 2013 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2375, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 16, 2013).
181. Meleney-Distassio v. Weinstein, No. FSTCV136018746S, 2013 Conn. Super. LEXIS
2375, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 16, 2013).
182. Id.
183. Meleny-Distassio v. Weinstein, No. FSTCV126015461S, 2013 Conn. Super. LEXIS
266, at *5, *23 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 1, 2013).
184. See Superior Court Case Look-up, FST-CV13-6018746-S, Meleney-Distassio, Anne,
Michael Distassio et al. v. Weinstein, MD, David et al., ST. OF CONN. JUD. BRANCH,
http://civilinquiry.jud.ct.gov/CaseDetail/PublicCaseDetail.aspx?DocketNo=FSTCV13601874
6S.
185. Meleney-Distassio v. Weinstein, No. FSTCV136018746S, 2014 Conn. Super. LEXIS
2861, at *6–7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2014).
186. Id. at *37–38; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-602(a) (2019).
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The Court concluded, however, the husband’s claim was derivative of the
physicians’ duty to the wife.187
The trial lasted five weeks.188 The defendants’ expert testified the initial test
of the amniotic fluid was 99.99992% accurate, presumably if the proper
protocols had been followed.189 In other words, the physicians reasonably
relied on the initial test, despite it being considered preliminary and less
accurate than the final test. On November 2, 2016, the jury deliberated for
two hours before returning a verdict in favor of the defendants.190
The Author has no information indicating the physicians in the case were
motivated by a desire to avoid legal liability or some other improper motives,
or that they did anything that merited liability, but the case illustrates many
of the concerns addressed above. First, the case shows a physician’s risk of
being sued, and the adverse consequences even when the physician prevails
in the case. The events underlying the suit occurred in June 2010. The initial
suit was filed in September 2012. The jury pronounced its verdict in
November 2016, a full six years after the incident and four years after the suit
was initially filed. The trial alone lasted five weeks. The defendants’ names
will forever be associated with this precedent-setting case, which, though
unpublished, is available on such databases as Lexis and Westlaw. One can
imagine the toll such litigation takes on a medical provider, and the reasons
a medical provider would wish to avoid a lawsuit, regardless of its outcome.
Moreover, taking the verdict on its face, the suit did not arise because the
providers did anything wrong, but rather because the circumstances made it
appear that the providers may have done something wrong, with grave
consequences. Had the plaintiffs established the providers’ liability, the
verdict may have been substantial.191 This chance to recover substantial
damages was likely an incentive to a plaintiffs’ attorney to prosecute the case,
even though liability was far from certain. One can also imagine the emotions
of the husband and wife that may have influenced them to pursue the suit.
Assuming the allegations of fact in the suit are generally accurate, the
plaintiffs had several prior unsuccessful attempts to bring a pregnancy to
187. Meleney-Distassio v. Weinstein, No. FSTCV136018746S, 2014 Conn. Super. LEXIS
2861, at *37–38 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2014).
188. NPM Advisory, supra note 161.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 2; Defendant’s Verdict Form, http://civilinquiry.jud.ct.gov/GetDocket.aspx
(search in search bar for “FST-CV13-6018746-S”; then click on “Verdict for Defendant”) (last
visited Oct. 29, 2019).
191. See supra note 129. But see Perry & Adar, supra note 137, at 544–47 (arguing that the
damage awards for wrongful abortion would be relatively small in most jurisdictions).
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term.192 They brought this pregnancy halfway to term only to receive a
dreadful diagnosis that induced them to abort the pregnancy.193 Almost
immediately after the abortion, they learned the information they trusted was
potentially wrong, and within a week of the abortion, the diagnosis was
reversed.194 A couple that experienced this could be strongly motivated to sue.
The case also presents a circumstance in which the parties are reasonably
likely to have very different recollections of the key facts. The central question
is what information was communicated to the woman about this test, the test
results, and the actions she should take (if any) in light of the test results.
Some information was likely communicated to her in conjunction with the
ultrasound showing club feet, indicating this could be a sign of a fatal fetal
diagnosis. The rest of the information may have been communicated to her
shortly before the amniocentesis or in the telephone call regarding the test
results. One can imagine the emotional state of the woman at these times.
Likewise, given the fickleness of memory and the desire to avoid liability, it is
plausible both the providers’ and the family’s accounts of the information
communicated may be erroneous in part.
One easily sees in this scenario the difficult position of the physicians.
They had what appeared to be a reliable, preliminary test result confirming
their previous suspicions of a serious, incurable, and probably fatal, fetal
anomaly. State law precluded abortion in such cases after fetal viability,
which was imminent. They had to disclose the results. They had to discuss
the option of abortion. They had to do so promptly, while abortion was still
a legal option. They had to determine how to frame the discussion—what to
disclose and how to present it. No matter what they might say, they were at
risk of a lawsuit if the mother elected to bring the child to term. What makes
this case extraordinary is that the physicians were sued despite the mother
electing to terminate the pregnancy, because of the chance fact that the
laboratory determined, despite the abortion, that the initial test result was
erroneous.
This case certainly demonstrates the practical consequences of imperfect
information. Assuming the test produces a false positive in only 8 of every
10,000,000 instances, consistent with the claim the initial test was 99.99992%
accurate, the likelihood that this positive test result was a false positive was at

192. Meleney-Distassio v. Weinstein, No. FSTCV136018746S, 2014 Conn. Super. LEXIS
2861, at *3–4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2014).
193. Id. at *4.
194. Meleney-Distassio v. Weinstein, No. FSTCV136018746S, 2013 Conn. Super. LEXIS
2375, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 16, 2013).
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least 500 to 1—if the test procedures were properly followed.195 The available
information does not disclose the “technical difficulties” that led the
laboratory to conclude the June 15 report was unreliable, even prior to the
laboratory completing the second test. The laboratory may have detected a
human or equipment error. However, technical difficulties, human error,
equipment errors, and failures of laboratory protocol are unavoidable risks
that a physician could consider in presenting test results and his or her
recommendations.196 Such risk could greatly reduce the reliability of the test
result.
The presentation of this case in this manner, however, has a notable
downside. This case apparently involved the abortion of a relatively healthy
fetus based on an erroneous prenatal diagnosis. The attorneys for one of the
physicians called the lab’s error “sad and shocking.”197 One might assume it
was “sad” because a healthy fetus was aborted on a mistaken diagnosis. The
corollary might be that it would not be “sad” if the fetus in fact had the
Trisomy 18 syndrome. This line of reasoning, however, may judge any fetus
with the Trisomy 18 syndrome as more worthy of being aborted than a
healthy fetus. As discussed below, such eugenic and discriminatory social
attitudes demean all those living with the Trisomy 18 syndrome. As such, it
is important to note that abortion in such instances is still elective abortion.
The option to continue the pregnancy should not be discounted. While
miscarriages or stillbirths are common as affected pregnancies progress,
many children with Trisomy 18 are born alive.198 Depending in part on the
195. This calculation presumes that the odds of a pregnancy being afflicted by a Trisomy
18 defect is 1 in 2,500, consistent with the available data. Cereda & Carey, supra note 163, at 2.
If so, then 10,000,000 tests would produce approximately 4,000 true positives and 8 false
positives, or about 500 true positives for every false positive. That being said, factors such as
the mother’s age affect the likelihood that the particular pregnancy is afflicted by a Trisomy
18, affecting this calculation. Id. Moreover, the detection of clubfeet in the ultrasound
increased the probability that this pregnancy was a risk for a Trisomy 18 defect, as compared
to a random sample population. Thus, while a positive test result may be erroneous in
approximately 1 of 500 cases based on a random sampling, the doctors had to consider the
additional information they had in assessing whether it was likely that this positive result was
a false positive. Unless most pregnancies tested using this method had similar indicators that
the condition was present, the evidence of the clubfeet could greatly increase the odds that this
was a true positive—so long as the test procedures had been followed. It is not uncommon,
however, for attorneys to mislead juries, or be misled themselves, through flawed probabilistic
logic.
196. E.g., Zadrozny, supra note 110 (allegation that human error caused an erroneous
diagnosis of an intersex fetus).
197. NPM Advisory, supra note 161.
198. Cereda & Carey, supra note 163, at 3.
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gravity of the child’s physical condition, a family may elect anything from
palliative care to extraordinary interventions.199 In some cases where the
child’s condition is incompatible with prolonged life, the family may accept
that fact and spend what little time they have with the infant without medical
intervention, or with limited medical intervention.200 Sixty to seventy-five
percent of the infants born alive with Trisomy 18 syndrome survive the first
twenty-four hours; forty to sixty percent survive a week; twenty-two to fortyfour percent live at least six months; and five to ten percent celebrate their
first birthday.201 An article by Anna Cereda and John C. Carey briefly
highlights with images three instances of individuals with the Trisomy 18
syndrome: a two-year-old boy who was “quite stable medically, gaining
weight, sitting up, and participating in the many activities of his family”; a
sixteen-year-old girl who was “very healthy” whose “favorite pastime” was
feeding herself, and who walked with assistance and could climb stairs on her
own; and a young lady who, despite having “full [T]risomy 18 in early
childhood and in adolescence,” lived to nineteen years old “and achieved
multiple milestones, including sitting and walking in a walker.”202 Simply put,
even in the case of a Trisomy 18 defect, the family can elect to try to continue
the pregnancy to term, to build a relationship with the child, to love the child
and accept the child regardless of the child’s chromosomal condition.203
Indeed, in some cases, the child may survive to return the love. Put another
way, there is still room for hope.
IV. THE SOCIAL AND MORAL COSTS OF THIS ARRANGEMENT
From a strictly utilitarian perspective, social harms stemming from
encouraging the abortion of children with special needs are not particularly
obvious. Detecting serious medical conditions in utero and avoiding the
economic and social costs attending those cases seems to be a social good.204
Likewise, many families would experience extreme financial and emotional

199. Id. at 5–7.
200. See Igniter Media, 99 Balloons, YOUTUBE (Apr. 3, 2007), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=th6Njr-qkq0.
201. Cereda & Carey, supra note 163, at 5.
202. Id. at 2, 8.
203. E.g., Igniter Media, supra note 200.
204. See, e.g., Hensel, supra note 7, at 178; David T. Morris, Cost Containment and
Reproductive Autonomy: Prenatal Genetic Screening and the American Health Security Act of
1993, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 295, 301–03 (1994); Say, supra note 14, at 255–56; see also Dixon,
supra note 10, at 12.
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difficulties in caring for a child with serious special needs.205 Autonomy and
self-determination in such reproductive decisions are typically proffered as a
social good.206 Some suggest that the child, at least in some cases, has a right
to be aborted—that a life with disabilities, or with severe disabilities, is not
worth living.207 This Part, however, presents several reasons why our
medicolegal system should not encourage the abortion of special needs
children as it does.
First, a system that incentivizes a doctor’s distortion of the truth in
communicating with a patient to mitigate the risk of personal or professional
harm to the doctor should strike any person of integrity as a social evil.208
This is not to portray medical providers as lacking moral fiber; the system is
dysfunctional.
Second, even assuming abortion is a morally neutral act, our society
typically regards free and informed choice as a positive good.209 Systemic
incentives for a medical provider to persuade a mother to choose abortion
infringe on the woman’s ability to make a free and informed choice.210
Pressure for a prompt decision prior to an adjustment to the new, adverse
reality obstructs free choice.211 A prognosis that emphasizes the worst-case
scenario, rather than the range of probable scenarios, may undermine an

205. E.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-57, CHILDREN WITH DOWN
SYNDROME: FAMILIES ARE MORE LIKELY TO RECEIVE RESOURCES AT TIME OF DIAGNOSIS THAN IN
EARLY CHILDHOOD (Oct. 2010), https://www.gao.gov/assets/320/311235.pdf (finding that the
total average medical expenditures for children with Down syndrome, from birth through
early childhood, was an average of five times higher than the expenditures for children without
Down syndrome).
206. See Belsky, supra note 44, at 267; Dixon, supra note 10, at 12; Frati et al., supra note
4, at 339–40; Hensel, supra note 7, at 190–91.
207. E.g. Belsky, supra note 44, at 243–44; Foutz, supra note 4, at 496–97; Hensel, supra
note 7, at 181.
208. Cf. Belsky, supra note 44, at 246 (arguing that genetic counselors have the obligation
to impart all medical information to parents deciding whether to terminate a pregnancy due
to the risk the child will have special needs). Studies indicate the care of women who continue
the pregnancy despite an adverse diagnosis may be compromised when healthcare
professionals view termination of the pregnancy as the more appropriate decision. Lalor et al.,
supra note 90, at 87.
209. See Curran, supra note 10, at 135–38; cf. Belsky, supra note 44, at 267–68 (arguing
that the right to abort a child diagnosed as potentially having special needs “should be
respected by the medical provider as the decision of both parents and child, and accorded legal
protection through pecuniary sanction”).
210. See Dixon, supra note 10, at 46–50, 53–54; Hensel, supra note 7, at 191; Diehr, supra
note 4, at 1301–02, 1307–08.
211. Buck, supra note 31, at 918–19; Dixon, supra note 10, at 4, 39–40.
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informed choice.212 A decision made in emotional or physical isolation from
other personal, medical, or spiritual advisors is not always a free or informed
choice.213 While many of these scenarios may not give rise to a legally
enforceable right of action against the medical provider, they are still
objectionable on moral or ethical grounds.214
Related to this point, psychology and behavioral economics studies
indicate that we tend to perform poorly in tasks of affective forecasting—
evaluating our ability to cope with or to adjust to adverse developments in
our lives.215 We tend to overestimate the duration and severity of negative
emotions associated with foreseen persistent adversities.216 This seems to
arise from three interacting cognitive biases: focalism, which is the tendency,
when evaluating an anticipated change, to focus more on what will change
with the foreseen adversity than on what will stay the same; immune neglect,
which is the failure to envision the effect of one’s own coping skills; and the
failure to predict adaptation, whereby personal values evolve with changes in
circumstances.217 A prognosis emphasizing the worst-case scenario likely has
a disproportionate impact on a person’s decision-making with respect to his
or her estimation of long-term happiness.218 Imagining the worst-case
scenario can increase focalism and the immune neglect and inhibit imagining
adaptions.219 Emotional disturbances can increase the effect of these cognitive
biases.220 Drs. Jodi Halpern and Robert M. Arnold explain:
[F]ear can rivet attention on the most frightening aspects of
a situation . . . or convince a person that a possible threat is
inevitable. Distress can block memories of better times,
limiting one’s ability to form more hopeful beliefs about the
future. Patients who are afraid and upset project these
intense feelings onto the future, and anxiety can undermine
212. See Buck, supra note 31, at 918–921; Diehr, supra note 4, at 1307–08.
213. Cf. Buck, supra note 31, at 918–921 (discussing factors that undermine a patient’s
informed consent).
214. See generally Brown, supra note 4, at 870 (discussing the various standards used in
lack of informed consent cases and gaps in the protections afforded); Curran, supra note 10.
215. E.g., KAHNEMAN, supra note 26, at 101–03, 402–06; Daniel Kahneman, Evaluation by
Moments: Past and Future, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 693, 702–07 (Daniel Kahneman
& Amos Tversky eds., 2000); Halpern & Arnold, supra note 29, at 1710.
216. KAHNEMAN, supra note 26, at 101–03, 402–06; Kahneman, supra note 215, at 702–
07; Halpern & Arnold, supra note 29, at 1709.
217. Halpern & Arnold, supra note 29, at 1708–10.
218. KAHNEMAN, supra note 26, at 88, 101–03, 263–370, 402–06.
219. Halpern & Arnold, supra note 29, at 1709–10.
220. Id. at 1710.
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the reflectiveness needed to recognize such projections and
address them.221
It appears this is true for women that experience adverse prenatal diagnoses.
While distress is high following the discovery of the fetal anomaly, the
distress tends to decline to near normal levels by the time the pregnancy
reaches full term for those that continue the pregnancy.222
Third, abortion in such circumstances has well-documented adverse
psychological risks that should be fairly disclosed by the provider
recommending the abortion.223 The risks include a sense of guilt, distress, and
damaged relationships.224 Moreover, one study showed that of women who
elected to terminate a pregnancy due to an adverse prenatal diagnosis, fortysix percent were experiencing pathological levels of post-traumatic stress and
twenty-eight percent were experiencing depression four months after the
termination.225 The symptoms continued for another year for nearly half of
the affected women.226 Predictors of these adverse psychological
consequences included self-efficacy, high level of doubt during decisionmaking, lack of partner support, religious beliefs, and advanced gestational
age.227 Granted, women who choose to continue a pregnancy despite an
adverse prenatal diagnosis may also experience depression and distress, but
as noted above, the distress tends to decline to near normal levels by the time
the pregnancy reaches full term, as compared to pregnant women without
adverse prenatal diagnoses.228 While some of the adverse psychological effects
of termination are likely the result of the social stigma concerning abortion,229
221. Id.
222. Anne Kaasen et al., Maternal Psychological Responses During Pregnancy After
Ultrasonicgraphic Detection of Structural Fetal Anomalies: A Prospective Longitudinal
Observational Study, PLS ONE (Mar. 28, 2017), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0174412.
223. See France et al., supra note 150, at 25, 30 (noting the lack of guidelines or protocols
on the matter); Marijke J. Korenromp et al., Adjustment to Termination of Pregnancy for Fetal
Anomaly: A Longitudinal Study in Women at 4, 8, and 16 Months, 201 AM. J. OF OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 160.e1 (2009); Korenromp, supra note 135, at 11; Pitt, McClaren, & Hodgson,
supra note 89, at 171.
224. France et al., supra note 150, at 25, 27, 29–30.
225. Korenromp et al., supra note 223, at 160.e4.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Kaasen et al., supra note 222; see also Heidi Cope et al., Pregnancy Continuation and
Organizational Religious Activity Following Prenatal Diagnosis of a Lethal Fetal Defect Are
Associated with Improved Psychological Outcome, 35 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 761 (2015).
229. See France et al., supra note 150, at 25, 27, 29–30; Franz Hanschmidt et al., Stigma in
the Context of Pregnancy Termination After Diagnosis of Fetal Anomaly: Associations with
Grief, Trauma, and Depression, 21 ARCHIVES OF WOMEN’S MENTAL HEALTH 391 (2018).
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that is probably not the primary cause.230 Even still, these adverse
psychological risks ought to be considered in evaluating the current practices
and system.
Fourth, abortion and policies promoting abortion in cases of poor prenatal
diagnoses likely contribute to the marginalization of people with special
needs in our society.231 Each person with special needs in our society will
interact with or encounter a large number of people, and abortions that
eliminate people with special needs reduce the frequency and diversity of
those interactions.232 This presumably contributes to our society’s general
evaluation of what constitutes “normal,” “appropriate,” “necessary,” and
“good” to the disadvantage of those with special needs. These evaluations
affect public policy, public or private accommodations, medical treatment,
and public or private personal behavior.233 For instance, if disabilities are
viewed predominantly to be a product of age or tragedy, a young person with
special needs will more often be viewed as embodying a tragedy, rather than
being viewed as a person that engages the world on different terms.234 These
attitudes can have perverse effects on social expectations concerning those
with special needs and their role in our shared society.235 They may also

230. See generally Korenromp, supra note 135. A collection of studies from the
Netherlands show high incidents of depression and post-traumatic stress disorder among
women, and, to a lesser extent, their partners, who terminated a pregnancy due to a fetal
anomaly, including a small fraction with clinical symptoms two to seven years after the
termination, even though one of the studies concluded there was low social pressure to carry
the pregnancy to term under such circumstances.
231. Bernstein, supra note 4, at 320–21; Diehr, supra note 4, at 1308; Dixon, supra note
10, at 4, 12–21; Frati et al., supra note 4, at 350; Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch, The Disability
Rights Critique of Prenatal Genetic Testing: Reflections and Recommendations, in PRENATAL
TESTING AND DISABILITY RTS. 3 (Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch eds., 2000).
232. Cf. Diehr, supra note 4, at 1309 (“One side effect of the drastically increased number
of fetuses with disabilities being aborted would be the necessarily decreased pool of peers for
persons born with disabilities.”).
233. See Dixon, supra note 10, at 8, 12–21. But see Belsky, supra note 44, at 245
(“Improvements in genetic technology must advance, even at the expense of social stigma.
Tort law is not responsible for the stigma associated with being born with a given handicap; it
serves only to encourage prudent behavior through pecuniary penalty. Thus, the exactitude of
science, and not the expansion of tort law, will make it increasingly difficult for society to
accept the birth of avoidably impaired children.”); Hensel, supra note 7, at 147–48.
234. See Hensel, supra note 7, at 185.
235. Diehr, supra note 4, at 1302, 1308–10; see also Frati et al., supra note 4, at 340 (“In
today’s society, there is a widespread feeling that it is not life that should be protected at all
costs, but the quality of life.”).
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impact an expectant parent’s willingness to bring a handicapped person into
the world.236
Judging people by their disabilities and conditions—or, perhaps more
euphemistically, their quality of life—demeans both their abilities and their
subjectivity.237 It demeans their status as a human person. It demeans the
status of all who share the condition. Aborting children in utero because of
their condition can be viewed as the moral equivalent of, if not a definite and
perverse form of, discrimination on the basis of disability.238 As many authors
have pointed out, wrongful birth and wrongful life lawsuits, which allow a
parent or a disabled person to sue a doctor for compensation due to a
disability the doctor did not cause, demean all who share the condition at
issue. These suits send a public message that abortion—terminating the
child’s existence—is an appropriate course of care for the disability.239 This
contributes to a general, biased perspective that a person with a disability is
less than a normal person, rather than a person who engages the world on
different terms.240 This is contrary to the values implicit in our social
restraints on discrimination and the constitutional command for equal
protection of the laws, even though the value is not extended in law to the
protection of unborn children with special needs.241
The experiences of a person with disabilities, especially one with
disabilities from birth, cannot easily be evaluated by a person without

236. See Halpern & Arnold, supra note 29, at 1710 (“[Social] stigma forms a powerful
barrier to envisioning adapting to disability. Stigmatizing images of illness and disability
depict broken and unfulfilling lives.”).
237. Diehr, supra note 4, at 1307.
238. E.g., Ruth Hubbard, Abortion and Disability: Who Should and Should Not Inhabit
the World?, in THE DISABILITY STUD. READER 74 (Lennard J Davis ed., 4th ed. 2013).
239. E.g., Diehr, supra note 4, at 1297–1301; Foutz, supra note 4, at 488; Frati et al., supra
note 4, at 350; Hensel, supra note 7, at 173; Kennedy, supra note 4, at 485; Schuster, supra note
4, at 2339–41.
240. Diehr, supra note 4, at 1292–94; Hensel, supra note 7, at 173.
241. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”), and Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
§ 2, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2009), with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157–58 (1973) (finding that “the
word ‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.”).
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disabilities.242 Not only are the struggles misunderstood, but the joys are also
misapprehended.243 A passage from Harlan Hahn is well worth quoting:
[D]isabled persons do not experience the external
environment in the same way as the nondisabled. The focus
of attention is different; the concentration of energy is
different; the impressions formed in personal interactions
are different . . . . [M]any of their viewpoints might
encompass both positive aspects of everyday life that the
nondisabled tend to take for granted—the sensuous touch of
a sheet on the skin, the exhilaration of simply moving from
here to there, the joy of communicating with a world that
once seemed dark or silent.244
Much the same can be said of parenting a child with special needs. As a father
of a daughter whose congenital brain malformation in the area of her speech
cortex leaves her largely unable to process words, it is remarkable to see her
response to music. What must it be like, in this cynical age, to have a brain
shaped by music rather than language? The struggles and joys of raising a
child with special needs are grossly misunderstood by most who have not
shared the experience.
Fifth, the challenge of caring for and improving the lives of those with
special needs will advance the science of medicine.245 When abortion is an
acceptable and encouraged option, there is less pressure to develop more
accurate diagnostic methods and better treatments. The abortion of children
with special needs also represents the loss of information about the prognosis
of people with such conditions. While one might justly recoil from the idea
of treating a person with special needs as simply a source of medical data, one
cannot deny that the battle to treat people with special needs may advance
the science of medicine, to the benefit of many.
Sixth, each person with special needs may contribute to society in
ordinary, special, or even exceptional ways. While those with special needs
242. See Halpern & Arnold, supra note 29, at 1708–10; Kahneman, supra note 215, at 703–
04 (discussing studies that indicate that people tend to underestimate the long-term mood of
paraplegics).
243. Dixon, supra note 10, at 55 (analogizing the birth of a child with special needs to
planning a trip to Italy and finding that you arrived in Holland—“[i]t is just a different place”);
Halpern & Arnold, supra note 29, at 1708–10; Hensel, supra note 7, at 183–84.
244. Harlan Hahn, Feminist Perspectives, Disability, Sexuality and Law: New Issues and
Agendas, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 97, 111 (1994).
245. Dixon, supra note 10, at 4.
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may require a large amount of care, economic resources, and attention, these
costs are incommensurate as compared to even the simple joys that may
come with knowing a person with special needs.246 This is not intended to
minimize the difficulty, burden, or cost of caring for a person with special
needs, but there is no currency that allows for an objective measurement of
the economic costs as compared to the intangible benefits of such an
interaction.
Finally, embracing the challenge of caring for each person with special
needs also affirms the intrinsic value of each person, a value that is not based
on what the person contributes or does.247 Caring for those with special needs
provides the caregivers an opportunity to learn to love another—to seek the
other’s good—without regard to the personal return. This capacity and
opportunity for altruism is a social good.248
In short, the current system, which incentivizes providers to recommend
or even promote abortion in cases of adverse fetal diagnoses, is at odds with
several values our society rightly prioritizes. These include integrity, free and
informed choice, nondiscrimination, respect for the experience of others,
equal protection under the law, scientific advancement, and social altruism.
With this in mind, we will turn to potential solutions.
V. POSSIBLE REMEDIES
If the current interplay between law and medicine is negatively impacting
society by incentivizing the abortion of children in utero with poor prenatal
diagnoses, what can be done to alter that situation? There is no obvious
solution, but this final Part surveys some options.
246. Diehr, supra note 4, at 1299 (“The rationales courts use both to award and to deny
recovery for ‘normal’ children stand in contrast to those articulated by jurisdictions
recognizing wrongful birth or wrongful life in the context of a child born with a genetic defect.
While courts give heavy emphasis to the inherent benefits of rearing a child in the former,
many courts ignore these benefits in the latter. This is despite evidence that many families find
life with a child with a disability to be a positive experience.”). Cf. Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d
124, 128 (Tex. 1973) (“[A] strong case can be made that, at least in an urban society, the rearing
of a child would not be a profitable undertaking if considered from the economics alone.
Nevertheless, . . . the satisfaction, joy and companionship which normal parents have in
rearing a child make such economic loss worthwhile. These intangible benefits, while
impossible to value in dollars and cents are undoubtedly the things that make life worthwhile.
Who can place a price tag on a child’s smile or the parental pride in a child's achievement?”);
Jackson, supra note 4, at 595–600, 606 (discussing the policy reasons to reject an award of
damages for the wrongful birth of a healthy or unhealthy child).
247. See Diehr, supra note 4, at 1299–1300.
248. See C. Daniel Batson & Adam A. Powell, Altruism and Prosocial Behavior, in 5
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOL. 463 (Theodore Millon & Melvin J. Lerner eds., 2003).
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Advocates of abortion rights will correctly note that part of the problem
arises from restrictions on late-term, nontherapeutic abortions.249 As noted
above, if a poor prenatal diagnosis is made twenty-two weeks into the
pregnancy, and the state prohibits nontherapeutic abortions after twentyfour weeks, the law is an external pressure for a prompt decision.
Adjustments could be made to these laws to allow greater freedom to make
an informed decision without the pressures of time. This would not address
the entire problem, but it would address at least one part of the problem.
Opponents of abortion would likely advocate for greater legal restrictions
on abortion. These restrictions may include prohibiting abortions targeting
fetal anomalies, instituting mandatory waiting periods for abortions, and
establishing mandatory disclosures of information prior to providing an
abortion. It may include these and other methods to reduce the isolation the
woman feels, the pressures on her for a prompt decision, or the risk that the
provider will deliver incomplete or inaccurate information.250 Each of these
proposals may have merit, if viewed objectively, but they would restrain
abortion and will be opposed by many on that basis alone.251 They may also
interfere, to some degree, in the doctor-patient communications, making
them vulnerable to social criticism and prone to constitutional challenges.252
If mandating disclosure of information is socially or politically
unacceptable, disclosures might still be encouraged. For instance, the federal
Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act,253 enacted
in 2008, authorized “the awarding of grants, contracts or cooperative
agreements” to entities to “collect, synthesize, and disseminate current
evidence-based information relating to Down syndrome or other prenatally
or postnatally diagnosed conditions” and to “coordinate the provision of, and
access to, new or existing supportive services for patients receiving a positive
diagnosis for Down syndrome or other prenatally or postnatally diagnosed
conditions.”254
249. See Mary Ziegler, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 587, 606–10 (2017).
250. See Diehr, supra note 4, at 1315–17; Dixon, supra note 10, at 43–44, 48.
251. See Hensel, supra note 7, at 173.
252. E.g., Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 2014) (invalidating, on First
Amendment grounds, a North Carolina statute requiring physicians to perform an
ultrasound, display a sonogram, and describe the fetus to each woman seeking an abortion).
But see, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (allowing
states to require the disclosure of truthful, non-misleading information about the nature of
the abortion procedure and the attendant health risks and those of childbirth).
253. Pub. L. No. 110-374, 122 Stat. 4051 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 280g-8 (2010)).
254. 42 U.S.C.S. § 280g-8(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2010); Diehr, supra note 4, at 1315–16; see also
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 191.923.3 (2007) (creating a similar arrangement).
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One might consider tort reform options.255 On one extreme, the causes of
action for wrongful birth and wrongful life could be abolished, eliminating
much of the concern of legal liability. Disability rights advocates may favor
this approach, as wrongful life and wrongful birth reinforce the public
perception that nonexistence is preferable to living with special needs.256 One
author argues that permitting such suits violates the Americans with
Disabilities Act.257 Abolishing such claims, however, may infringe on other
social values.258 In addition to the remedial, punitive, and deterrent functions
served generally by civil suits against medical providers, discussed in Part I,
suits in cases involving poor prenatal diagnoses or children born with special
needs help to preserve the social values associated with the mother’s right to
choose abortion or to choose to continue the pregnancy.259 A medical
provider who intentionally or negligently fails to discover or to disclose
information pertinent to the decision whether or not to abort the pregnancy
may be accused of infringing the rights of the patient or substituting his
judgment for hers.260 In fact, statutes prohibiting wrongful birth and
wrongful life lawsuits have been challenged, so far unsuccessfully, as
unconstitutional restraints on abortion.261 Tort reform options short of
abolishing the causes of action, such as damage limitations or procedural
hurdles in pursuing such suits, will likely affect the number of suits, but may
not impact the specter of such suits that drives the practice of defensive
medicine.262 Perhaps more creative solutions, such as a right of the parents,

255. A 2014 survey of 600 physicians found that 91% of them believed malpractice reform
would reduce unnecessary testing and procedures. Unnecessary Tests and Procedures in the
Health Care System, PERRYUNDEM RES./COMM. 1, 9 (May 1, 2014), http://www.choosingwisely.
org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Final-Choosing-Wisely-Survey-Report.pdf.
256. E.g., Diehr, supra note 4, at 1287–88, 1295, 1297–98, 1312–14; Hensel, supra note 7.
257. See Sheth, supra note 4, at 661–62.
258. See generally, e.g., Say, supra note 14, at 281–89 (arguing against such legislation on
the grounds of public health, reproductive autonomy, and allocation of harms).
259. Belsky, supra note 44, at 246; Diehr, supra note 4, at 1301; see Hensel, supra note 7,
at 172–73.
260. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Lab, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811 (1980); Gleitman v. Cosgrove,
227 A.2d 689, 703 (N.J. 1967); Hensel, supra note 7, at 167–69; Jackson, supra note 4, at 574–
75; Kennedy, supra note 4, at 491–92.
261. Say, supra note 14, at 277–81.
262. See Furrow, supra note 20 (critiquing standard medical malpractice tort reform
efforts). Cf. Johnson, supra note 9, at 1016 (arguing that immunity statues may not alter
physician behavior, as the physicians may fear imperfect compliance would leave them
exposed to liability).
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on their own behalf and on the child’s behalf, to waive any right to sue for
wrongful birth or wrongful life, might have some value.263
An alternative to making suits impossible or more difficult would be to
make suits easier.264 The central concern disclosed in this analysis is that
medical providers can offer incomplete or inaccurate information to
persuade a woman to choose abortion, because the abortion would decrease
the provider’s risk of a lawsuit. Facilitating lawsuits in cases where the
provider presents incomplete or inaccurate information could restore
balance in the providers’ risk calculus.265 In theory, one might use existing
tort claims in this situation. As illustrated in Part III, “wrongful abortion”
claims have been tested in a few jurisdictions. In many jurisdictions, however,
an abortion performed competently may not be considered an injury, even if
the woman’s consent to the procedure was based on inadequate
disclosures.266 Moreover, in the leading article exploring wrongful abortion
based on negligence, Professors Ronen Perry and Yehuda Adar argue that
traditional tort rules do not adequately address all of the social harms arising
from wrongful abortion.267 The relatively low damage award would still leave
an incentive for providers to err on the side of recommending abortion, and
the difficulty of detecting the negligence diminishes the systemic

263. The potential use of such exculpatory agreements in the medical malpractice field
received great attention following a discussion of the topic the popular book Nudge in 2008.
See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 207–12 (2008). Thaler and Sunstein’s recommendation of a waiver,
largely on other grounds, has generated substantial discussion in legal literature. E.g., Tom
Baker & Timothy D. Lytton, Essay, Allowing Patients To Waive the Right To Sue for Medical
Malpractice: A Response to Thaler and Sunstein, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 233 (2010). The idea of
exculpatory agreements for medical malpractice are far older, though. See Matthew J.B.
Lawrence, Note, In Search of an Enforceable Medical Malpractice Exculpatory Agreement:
Introducing Confidentiality Contracts as a Solution to the Doctor-Patient Relationship Problem,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 850, 851 (2009) (referencing and citing prior articles); Havighurst &
Richman, supra note 31, at 67 (discussing similar contractual arrangements to reduce costs).
264. Perry & Adar, supra note 137, at 567–71.
265. But see Perry & Adar, supra note 137, at 544–47 (arguing that civil suits will not work
for this purpose).
266. Cf. Curran, supra note 10 (analyzing whether a hypothetical woman who consents
to an epidural without complete medical disclosures would have claims under the alternative
legal standards employed by various states, and concluding that she often would not if the
epidural was competently performed).
267. Perry & Adar, supra note 137, at 544–47.
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effectiveness of this remedy.268 One might also consider a fraud-based claim,
but these claims will have similar limitations.269
A state might better address this scenario, therefore, by expressly
authorizing suit if a doctor communicates incomplete or inaccurate
information that influences a person to consent to an abortion.270 This
solution does not restrain abortions per se, and it does not unreasonably
restrain doctor-patient communications. It merely requires truthful
communications, whatever the truth may be. States could tailor this concept
by prohibiting, for instance, only the communication of knowingly false
information, or false information with the intent to persuade a person to
choose an abortion, or inaccurate information likely to influence the decision
of a reasonably prudent patient, or information a reasonably skilled physician
would know to be erroneous.271 States could determine who has the right to
bring the suit: the mother, a representative of the deceased child, the father,
or a combination of these. Either the legislature or the judiciary would have
to determine what constitutes legally cognizable damages in such cases:
physical pain, emotional distress, the cost of medical care, or the loss of
companionship, to name a few possible categories.272 One option would be to
establish a right to recover attorney fees, expert fees, and costs together with
a specified amount, or with the greater of the actual damages or a specified
amount. This last approach may help disconnect the sanction from the
outcome and attach the sanctions to bad behavior, but the award of attorney
fees may provide too great of an incentive to plaintiffs’ attorneys in marginal
cases. Professors Perry and Adar argue for a similar solution, namely a
discretionary civil fine to be appended to civil lawsuits that successfully prove
a wrongful abortion.273
Professional sanctions for providing false information to encourage the
abortion of children with special needs may also be feasible,274 but they would
be subject to the politics and limited resources of medical boards and
disciplinary panels.275 Criminal prohibitions may only increase the practice
268. Id.
269. Cf. Buck, supra note 31 (exploring whether one can sue under the federal False
Claims Act for overtreatment due to inadequate disclosures).
270. Cf. Belsky, supra note 44, at 248 (proposing strict liability for inaccurate genetic
counseling resulting in the birth of a special needs child, on the product liability model).
271. Cf. Curran, supra note 10, at 142–57 (discussing existing reasonable medical
practitioner, reasonably prudent patient, and related medical malpractice standards).
272. See Buck, supra note 31, at 919.
273. Perry & Adar, supra note 137, at 571–79.
274. See id. at 507, 541–43; Diehr, supra note 4, at 1303.
275. McCarthy, supra note 18, at 586–93; Perry & Adar, supra note 137, at 544–47.
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of defensive medicine.276 They also would not likely be useful, except in a
symbolic sense, because prosecutors would be reluctant to pursue criminal
charges against a doctor for communications with a patient.277 Plaintiffs’
attorneys do not have the same reservations. Criminal statutes and
professional sanctions may also be subject to First Amendment scrutiny and
may be perceived as an unreasonable restraint on the right to abortion, even
though they would operate indirectly at best.278 They would likely have to be
more narrowly tailored than civil remedies.279
Another option would involve social security programs or other
government programs that reduce the burden of caring for children with
special needs.280 W. Ryan Schuster, for instance, suggests that no-fault based
programs similar to the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury
Compensation Program and the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury
Compensation Association can serve as a valuable substitute for prenatal
negligence lawsuits.281 Any such program must be judged on its merits, using
the dictates of reason and prudence. There often are, however, substantial
practical barriers to accessing the resources that are available.282 Parents
raising a child with special needs face a steep learning curve to understand
Medicaid and other programs that are intended to assist them, not to
mention the difficulty of maneuvering through the bureaucracy. Assistance
276. See Maurizio Cantino, Blame Culture and Defensive Medicine, 11 COGNITION, TECH.,
& WORK 248 (2009), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Maurizio_Catino/publication/
220579520_Blame_culture_and_defensive_medicine/links/58f4c998458515ff23b54d53/Blam
e-culture-and-defensive-medicine.pdf (“A professional system, like that of medicine, that is
subject to the constant risk of criminal investigation is not, then, a system that is more careful
and attentive; rather, it is a system that reduces the risks of the people who operate within it
by seeking greater formal guarantees of protection, thereby compromising the interests of the
clients.”); Perry & Adar, supra note 137, at 537–40, 550–54.
277. Perry & Adar, supra note 137, at 540.
278. Cf. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014) (invalidating, on First
Amendment grounds, a North Carolina statute requiring physicians to perform an
ultrasound, display a sonogram, and describe the fetus to each woman seeking an abortion).
279. See id.
280. Dixon, supra note 10, at 56–57; cf. id. at 6–8 (noting an anecdotal account of the
connection between the woman’s lack of economic resources and abortion of children with
Down syndrome, and the improvements that might be attributed in part to social services).
281. Schuster, supra note 4, at 2364–66; see also Christopher Smith, It’s a Mistake: Insurer
Cost Cutting, Insurer Liability, and the Lack of ERISA Preemption Within the Individual
Exchanges, 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 75, 112–23 (2014) (discussing the benefits and operation
mechanisms of a no-fault compensation system).
282. See Breaking Down Barriers to Medicaid Innovation: Rethinking Medicaid Waiver
Approval, AM. ACTION F. (Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/
breaking-down-barriers-to-medicaid-innovation-rethinking-medicaid-waiver-ap.
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programs, however, that are generally accessible to all those with
disabilities—or all those with disabilities in financial need, perhaps—are
preferable to large judgment payouts directed to the relatively few successful
litigants, payouts influenced by chance events, cheapened by deductions for
attorney fees and costs, and secured by litigating in a tax-subsidized court
system.283 The preconditions for assistance through social programs would
be the existence of a disability and perhaps financial need, whereas the
preconditions for a judgment payout would be a disability, a doctor’s
apparent negligence, a good lawyer, some persuasive expert witnesses,
testimony that the disabled person would have been aborted had the mother
known better, and some good luck.284
There are also abundant non-legal options for addressing the situation.
There are often community support groups or similar resources available for
those facing difficult pregnancies or raising children with special needs.285
These resources can be promoted to remedy the isolation and uncertainty
one would reasonably feel in facing a poor prenatal diagnosis. Hospitals can
also expand perinatal bereavement and palliative care, parental education,
and similar support options, as well as supporting nondirective counseling
and being more proactive in preparing an expectant mother and her family
for difficult decisions.286 Joan G. Lalor et al. provide several practical tips for
medical providers, including facilitating immediate, or at least prompt,
communications between the provider and the mother about the nature of
the anomaly detected; providing the family supplemental written materials,
or directing the family to reliable online information; using images to explain
the condition; connecting the families to a fetal medicine specialist promptly,
preferably within twenty-four hours; avoiding jargon in communicating
about the anomaly; connecting the family to a midwife with experience in
adverse prenatal conditions; allowing communications with medical
providers between appointments; not excluding the woman’s partner from
discussions; and arranging for continuity of the caregiver.287 Aligning
patients with doctors that share similar moral values would also allow for
greater trust and decrease the potential pressures that come with adverse
prenatal diagnoses. This may be difficult or impossible, especially where
283. Cf. AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 30, at 2–4 (discussing the costs and error rate in
medical malpractice litigation).
284. Diehr, supra note 4, at 1303–04.
285. See Carlsson et al., supra note 90, at 8.
286. Rocha Catania et al., When One Knows a Fetus Is Expected To Die: Palliative Care in
the Context of Prenatal Diagnosis of Fetal Malformations, 20 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 1020 (2017);
Dixon, supra note 10, at 32, 40, 47, 57–58; Lalor et al., supra note 90, at 81.
287. Lalor et al., supra note 90, at 83–87.
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there is a need for specialists, but it is an avenue to consider. Also, clear
communication in the doctor-patient relationship about the patient’s values,
and attention to these values by the provider, would typically benefit all the
parties.
In dialoguing directly with those facing a poor prenatal diagnosis for their
child, whether as a medical provider, a family member, a counselor, or a
friend, false pessimism is no better than false optimism, and potentially much
worse in the decision-making process, due to poor affective forecasting and
emotional vulnerability.288 It is important to be realistic about the range and
probability of possible outcomes, and what is known and unknown about the
condition, the prognosis, and the treatment options. Moreover, parents who
intended to bring the child to term should be allowed as much time as can be
afforded to adjust to the new reality before making a decision. They should
be made aware of the highs and lows that come with raising a child with
special needs and the range of experiences one will encounter, like fear and
powerlessness as your child is wheeled into an overnight emergency surgery,
to the joy of a smile when your child hears Patti Page sing “How Much Is
That Doggie in the Window.”
Drs. Jodi Halpern and Robert M. Arnold offer several practical tips to
address the cognitive biases and emotions that lead to poor affective
forecasting in medical decisions—that is, the tendency to estimate one’s
future happiness as more severely impaired by a foreseen medical adversity
than it actually will be.289 To address the bias of focalism, Halpern and Arnold
recommend identifying the person’s point of focus, have the person describe
all the similar types of things in that category, and then help the person
identify those things in the category that will not (or may not) be impaired.290
To take an extreme case, for a family with a child who is expected to die
shortly after birth, the parents are likely to focus on the child’s suffering and
the future the child will not have. One can help the family refocus on the life,
short as it may be, that the child may have with a loving family, experiencing
the physical touch, loving words, and warm embrace of family. To address
immune neglect—the tendency to discount one’s coping mechanisms—a
counselor can ask what has helped the person through past adversities,
reminding the person of his or her conscious coping mechanism, such as
humor, compartmentalization, intellectualization, and sublimation.291
288.
289.
290.
291.
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Cognitive behavioral therapy may also help.292 To help the family members
recognize their ability to adapt to adversity through adoption of new values,
support groups, anecdotes of similarly situated families, and interactive
decision aids with narratives may help.293 To address the emotional distress,
Halpern and Arnold suggest empathetic listening, cognitive reframing,
gathering social supports, and encouraging peer support groups.294 They also
emphasize the need to break down social stigmas related to disabilities.295
Social dialogue about poor prenatal diagnoses may also help curb the
pressure families may experience.296 Even those who oppose abortion in
principle may find it difficult to decline an abortion when they face an
unexpected poor prenatal diagnosis. In a state of extreme emotional
disturbance, the rational reasons for rejecting abortion are easily
overwhelmed by anxiety, uncertainty, disappointment, and fear. Those who
oppose abortion in such cases would do well, therefore, to address this reality
in their social communications rather than speaking to the issue only when
there is a particular need. A parent’s strong emotional response to
devastating news cannot easily be subordinated to reason in the moment. It
can be subordinated, however, if the person holds a competing value dearly,
such as a value connected, in the person’s mind, to the person’s self-identity
or the person’s sense of relationship. In other words, the negative emotional
response of fear, distress, and uncertainty is best tamed not by reason, but by
a stronger emotional adherence to a competing value. It may not be enough
to believe in the abstract that abortion is wrong, for instance; one must have
a strong emotional response against the idea that I would ever abort my child.
Teaching others to feel the value of every life, and in particular the value of
those with special needs, is a worthy goal too often ignored by those who
oppose abortion in the face of an adverse prenatal diagnosis.
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